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INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Various commentators have addressed frameworks for interaction between truth 
commissions and international war crimes tribunals.  These commentators have focused 
most prominently on the commission and tribunal that existed concurrently in Sierra 
Leone.1  Given recent progress on investigations in particular countries by the recently 
formed International Criminal Court (ICC), this article will examine how this permanent 
international criminal court might interact with truth commissions that emerge in these 
countries.2 
                                                 
* I would like to thank my Research Assistant, Timothy Petty, for his assistance with this Article (The 
College of New Jersey, Class of 2008; Seton Hall University School of Law, 1L).  Timothy provided both 
consistent and valuable assistance, especially with regard to the Background section of this Article. 
† Assistant Professor, The College of New Jersey. 
1 See, e.g., Elizabeth Evenson, Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone: Coordination Between Commission and 
Court, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 730 (2004); Michael Nesbitt, Lessons from the Sam Hinga Norman Decision of 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone: How Trials and Truth Commissions Can Co-Exist, 8 GERMAN L.J. 977 
(2007); William Schabas, Conjoined Twins of Transitional Justice? The Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1082 (2004).  Technically 
speaking, the war crimes tribunal for Sierra Leone is a “hybrid” domestic-international tribunal, and not a 
purely international tribunal, because it combines certain aspects of domestic and international crimes 
tribunals.   See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INTL. L. 295, 295 
(2003) (“Comparatively little attention has been paid  . . . to a . . . newly emerging[]  form of accountability 
and reconciliation: hybrid domestic-international courts.  Such courts are ‘hybrid’ because both the 
institutional apparatus and applicable law consist of a blend of the international and domestic.  Foreign 
judges sit alongside their domestic counterparts to try cases prosecuted and defended by teams of local 
lawyers working with those from other countries.  The judges apply domestic law that has been reformed to 
accord with international standards.  This hybrid model has developed in a range of settings, generally 
postconflict situations  where no politically viable full-fledged international tribunal exists, as in East 
Timor or Sierra Leone . . . .”); BARRY CARTER, PHILLIP TRIMBLE & ALLEN WEINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW  
1191–1994 (5th ed.  2007) (explaining that the war crimes tribunal for Sierra Leone consists of both judges 
appointed by the international community acting through the United Nations and judges appointed by 
Sierra Leone).  For sake of convenience and readability, this Article will refer to the war crimes tribunals in 
Sierra Leone and East Timor as international war crimes tribunals (as opposed to "hybrid" war crimes 
tribunals).  In any event, for the comparative and conceptual aims of this Article, the exact terminology 
employed would appear to matter little. 
2 While this article will largely focus on a putative truth commission in the Sudan, other countries where 
the ICC is investigating violations of international criminal law have also expressed interest in a truth 
commission.  For example, the Central African Republic had a short-lived Truth Commission in 2002 that 
investigated the causes of the human rights crisis in that country, and recommended specific reforms.  See 
U.S. Dep’t of State, Central African Republic: Country Reports on Human Rights Crises – 2003 (Feb. 25, 
2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27718.htm.  Also, in Uganda, a recent survey 
of citizens has indicated a desire for national and local authorities to form a strategy for peace and 
reconciliation in Uganda.  Many citizens are willing to sacrifice formal justice to achieve peace; in 
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¶2 For example, the UN and human rights organizations have called for the 
development of a truth commission in the Sudan, a country where the ICC is also 
currently conducting an investigation.3  As the ICC investigation proceeds in the Sudan, 
and prosecutions begin following the execution of recent arrest warrants,4 the ICC is 
likely to encounter not only additional prosecutions carried out by Sudanese courts but 
also a Sudanese truth commission.5  How the ICC interacts with truth commissions in 
countries like the Sudan is important for both the efficient operation of the individual 
institutions and for the successful transition of these countries out of periods of grave 
human rights abuses. 
¶3 After providing an overview of the basic features of truth commissions, Part I of 
the Article will explore situations where truth commissions and international war crimes 
tribunals have co-existed, drawing in large part upon the experiences of Sierra Leone and 
East Timor.  In addition, Part I will introduce the ICC as well as that Court’s on-going 
case in the Sudan for crimes occurring in the Darfur region of the country. 
¶4 Part II will focus on whether the work of a newly formed Sudanese truth 
commission would preclude ICC prosecutions of high-level Sudanese suspects in light of 
certain statutory provisions binding on the ICC.  Part II will conclude that in all 
likelihood the ICC would not have to defer to a Sudanese truth commission and could 
continue its prosecutions of those who commit grave crimes in the Sudan.  However, the 
Part will also attempt to develop a framework for when the ICC may be required to defer 
to the work of a truth commission.  In this regard, Part II will draw upon other ICC cases 
and truth commissions such as the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation 
(“CAVR”) in East Timor, and the ICC case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
For example, deference may be appropriate when a truth commission process includes 
                                                                                                                                                 
particular, they desire a public forum in which they can converse openly about their ordeals and in the 
process, establish an historical record.  See Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, Uganda, 
http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region1/629.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2009).  Lastly, in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), the 2002 Sun City Accords established the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in the DRC.  However, the Commission was never viewed as credible and did not hear a 
single case.  Though many Congolese recognize the urgent need for a victim-oriented truth commission 
process to aid in transitional justice, no serious proposals have been put forth as of yet.  Int’l Ctr. for 
Transitional Justice, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region1/646.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2009). 
3 A recommendation for a truth commission was made by the UN Security Council in its resolution 
referring the Sudanese case to the ICC.  See S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) 
(“[E]mphasiz[ing] the need to promote healing and reconciliation [in Sudan] and encourag[ing] in this 
respect the creation of institutions, involving all sectors of Sudanese society, such as truth and/or 
reconciliation commissions, in order to complement judicial processes and thereby reinforce the efforts to 
restore long-lasting peace, with African Union and international support as necessary.”). 
4 Following his initial investigations, the ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, first obtained arrest 
warrants in the Sudan for Harun and Kushayb.  These warrants are awaiting execution.  See Marlise 
Simmons, Judges Charge 2 Top Sudanese with Atrocities in Darfur Area, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2007, at 
A10.  In addition, the ICC Prosecutor, as a result of his continuing investigation in the Sudan, recently 
requested another arrest warrant from the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC. This warrant is for the sitting 
President of Sudan.  See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor Presents Case Against 
Sudanese President, Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes in 
Darfur (July 14, 2008) [hereinafter Al Bashir Press Release], available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/press/pressreleases/406.html. 
5 For a discussion of the legal and other implications for the ICC of domestic prosecutions in the Sudan, see 
generally Christopher Totten & Nicholas Tyler (Student Author), Arguing for an Integrated Approach to 
Resolving the Crisis in Darfur: The Challenges of Complementarity, Enforcement and  Related Issues in 
the International Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1069 (2008). 
Vol. 7:1] Christopher D. Totten 
 3
widespread participation by victims and perpetrators, various forms of victim assistance, 
and available amnesty is not only individual and conditional in character but also directed 
specifically towards a certain class of perpetrators (i.e., “low-level” perpetrators who 
commit minor offenses over a prescribed period of time), as was the case in East Timor. 
¶5 Part III will address information sharing between the ICC and a truth commission 
such as one in the Sudan.  This Part will argue for a conditional approach to information 
sharing, whereby the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC serves as the primary decision-maker 
on all matters related to the sharing of information between a truth commission and the 
ICC.  By accounting for certain aspects of information exchange between a truth 
commission and the ICC, at least some of the pitfalls experienced in other 
commission-Court relationships may be avoided (i.e., the uncertain nature 
of the sharing of confidential information between the international 
criminal tribunal and truth commission in Sierra Leone). 
¶6 Finally, Part IV will turn its attention to the issue of sentencing for Sudanese 
human rights violation perpetrators who testify before a truth commission prior to 
successful prosecution and conviction before the ICC.  This Part will argue that while the 
ICC should not honor any amnesty deals granted by a truth commission to high-level 
Sudanese perpetrators who committed grave crimes, the Court should take into account 
certain aspects of a perpetrator’s participation in the commission process as mitigating 
factors prior to issuing its final sentence.  In the case of low-level perpetrators, a 
Sudanese truth commission should adopt an approach similar to that of the truth 
commission in East Timor whereby individual perpetrators may be eligible for amnesty 
provided that they fulfill certain terms of a pre-approved reconciliation process, or 
agreement.  In this way, the Sudanese commission will assist in the important task of 
reintegrating these types of perpetrators back into their respective communities while at 
the same time not encroaching upon the responsibility of the ICC to convict and sentence 
those who commit more grievous international crimes. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Overview of Truth Commissions  
¶7 In her seminal study on truth commissions, entitled Fifteen Truth Commissions – 
1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, Priscilla Hayner posits one working definition for 
truth commissions generally, which includes four components: 
First, a truth commission focuses on the past.  Second, a truth commission 
is not focused on a specific event, but attempts to paint the overall picture 
of certain human rights abuses, or violations of international humanitarian 
law, over a period of time.  Third, a truth commission usually exists 
temporarily and for a pre-defined period of time, ceasing to exist with the 
submission of a report of its findings.  Finally, a truth commission is 
always vested with some sort of authority, by way of its sponsor, that 
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allows it greater access to information, greater security or protection to dig 
into sensitive issues, and a greater impact with its report.6 
¶8 In short, truth commissions are investigatory bodies usually created as part of a 
country’s political transition to examine human right rights violations.7  Truth 
commissions can be sponsored by domestic governments, most commonly the executive 
branch (though legislative branch sponsorship is also possible), or internationally by such 
bodies as the United Nations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs).8  An example 
of a commission with NGO sponsorship is the truth commission instituted in Rwanda 
immediately preceding the 1994 genocide, which was the result of a politically negotiated 
settlement between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic tribes.9  Furthermore, truth commissions 
generally arise “during or immediately after a political transition in a country”.10  As part 
of this examination, they can provide an explanation of the facts surrounding these 
violations,11 suggest reparations for the victims of the violations,12 or even recommend 
certain, future steps be taken to avoid their repetition.13  
¶9 In the context of comparing truth commissions to judicial trials, Martha Minow 
has argued that truth commissions may be a more suitable vehicle through which victims 
of human rights violations can acknowledge publicly the atrocities committed against 
them.  This acknowledgment is crucial for the victims, as it represents their “chance to 
tell [their story] and be heard without interruption or skepticism,” as would normally 
                                                 
6 Priscilla Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597, 
604 (1994).  Priscilla Hayner is co-founder of the International Center for Transitional Justice in New York 
City. 
7 Id. at 600. 
8 Id. at 600-04. 
9 Id. at 630 (“The roots of the Rwandan truth commission lie in an agreement between the government and 
the armed forces to establish a commission of inquiry into past atrocities – agreed to in the Arusha Accords 
negotiated in Arusha, Tanzania, in late 1992.”).  This agreement refers specifically to the International 
Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda. Since October 1, 1990, the 
Commission, with its lengthy name but only moderate success, was sponsored, at the request of indigenous 
Rwandan NGOs, by foreign NGOs from the United States, Canada, France and Burkina Faso.  Id. 
10 Id. at 608. 
11 Martha Minow posits that truth commissions may actually be better than trials in producing “a coherent, 
if complex narrative, about [an] entire nation’s trauma, and the multiple sources and expressions of its 
violence.”  See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 58, 78 (1998).  On the other 
hand, “trial records do not seek a full historical account beyond the action of particular individuals.”  Id. at 
78.  However, truth commissions, through “close historical analysis of testimony and documents [exposing] 
the influences of [various factors in causing the mass violence] . . . can do more than verdicts of guilt or 
innocence to produce a record for the nation and world, and a recasting of the past to develop bases for 
preventing future atrocities.”  Id. at 78-9. 
12 Other recommendations by truth commissions have addressed “military and police reform, the 
strengthening of democratic institutions, measures to promote national reconciliation, or reform of the 
judicial system.”  Hayner, supra note 6, at 609.  As to the role of truth commissions in promoting national 
reconciliation, Hayner notes that there is scholarly disagreement as to the extent of the ability of a 
commission to do so.  In fact, some have argued that commissions can “create deeper resentment and 
exacerbate old issues that have been dug up anew.”  Id.  
13 Hayner suggests that the reason truth commissions lessen the likelihood of future human rights violations 
may be because of their publishing of a reliable record of these violations, “with the hope that a more 
knowledgeable citizenry will recognize and resist any sign of return to repressive rule.”  Id.  Thus, truth 
commissions are also educative in the particular sense of informing future generations of steps they can 
take to prevent the repetition of human rights abuses. 
Vol. 7:1] Christopher D. Totten 
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occur in a trial or tribunal setting.14  Furthermore, Minow has argued that truth 
commissions offer victims of human rights violations a form of therapy by giving them 
an opportunity to speak about their trauma to a group of sympathetic witnesses.15  In 
particular, “truth commissions can give context to the human rights violations, and 
remind a viewing public of the human costs that were suppressed or unknown.”16 
¶10 Additionally, truth commissions may provide perpetrators certain forms of 
protection from future criminal prosecutions, such as blanket or partial amnesties.  These 
amnesties, in turn, may or may not be conditioned upon the fulfillment by the perpetrator 
of certain terms or conditions (e.g., in exchange for the amnesty).  The South African 
truth commission, for example, provided a type of amnesty to individuals who came 
before it, provided a full disclosure of the facts related to their abuses, and whose abuses 
were committed for political ends.17  (This is a type of partial, conditional amnesty since 
only politically-motivated crimes were eligible for amnesty, and amnesty was only 
obtained after the perpetrator disclosed certain facts before the truth commission body).  
Moreover, a truth commission may also opt to protect information provided by victims 
and witnesses from disclosure through the use of confidentiality clauses.  For example, 
information could be provided in confidence to both the CAVR, and the Sierra Leone 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission.18 
B. Sierra Leone 
¶11 This section will begin by providing an overview of the human rights crisis in 
Sierra Leone before turning its attention to the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the 
Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 
¶12 Sierra Leone experienced a human rights conflict that lasted nearly a decade 
(1991-1999).  This struggle resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and even more 
incidents of torture, mutilation, amputation, and rape.19  This conflict stemmed from a 
struggle for control of diamond mines.  Anti-government rebel groups used children as 
soldiers.  Many of these children endured forced amputations as well.20 
                                                 
14 Minow, supra note 11, at 58. 
15 Id. at 66-74.  Many observers and participants at court trials may be far from sympathetic.  Minow argues 
that “when the societal goals include restoring dignity to victims, offering a basis for individual healing, 
and also promoting reconciliation across a divided nation, a truth commission again may be as powerful as 
or more powerful than prosecutions.”  Id. at 88-89.     
16 Id. at 76.  Minow also comments that, as part of its role, a “truth commission is charged to produce a 
public report that recounts the facts gathered, and renders moral assessment.  It casts its findings and 
conclusions not in terms of individual blame but instead in terms of what was wrong and never justifiable.”  
Id. at 78. 
17 Azanian Peoples Org. v. President of S. Afr. 1996 (4) SA 672 (CC) at para. 5 (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1996/16.pdf. 
18 For a detailed discussion of the confidentiality clause in Sierra Leone, see infra note 48 and 
accompanying text.  This power on the part of the truth commission in Sierra Leone to declare testimony 
confidential, and thereby prevent its disclosure to third parties, may have been subject to limitation.  Id.  
For discussion o f confidentiality within the context of the truth commission in East Timor, see infra note 
78 and accompanying text.    
19 Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, Sierra Leone, http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region1/141.html (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2009) [hereinafter ICTJ website Sierra Leone].   
20 See id.  The war in Sierra Leone received international media attention due to the widespread policy of 
forced amputations that were carried out on very young children as well as adults.  Id. 
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¶13 The government of Sierra Leone and the rebel groups known as Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF)21 finally made an attempt to end the violence with the signing of the 
Lomé peace agreement in July of 1999.22  In particular, Lomé granted amnesty to all 
individuals who participated in the conflict.23  The government and rebel groups included 
a provision for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.24  A law 
implemented this Commission in 2000, although it did not become operational until 
2002.25 
¶14 Despite the peace agreement, violence erupted again in Sierra Leone in May of 
2000.  RUF forces captured a contingent of UN peacekeepers stationed in Sierra Leone, 
which prompted Britain to intervene on the peacekeepers’ behalf.26  Following this event, 
the government of Sierra Leone asked the UN to form a court to aid in the prosecution of 
the most serious violators of humanitarian law.27  The process of prosecuting the most 
serious offenders began in 2002, and is expected to last several years.28 
1. Special Court for Sierra Leone 
¶15 In January of 2002, as part of a formal agreement, the United Nations and the 
Sierra Leone government jointly established the Special Court to prosecute the greatest 
violators of international and Sierra Leonean law that committed grave crimes after 
November 20, 1996.29  As of January 2009, thirteen persons have been indicted by the 
Court.  Two of these indictments have been withdrawn due to deaths of the accused 
before a judgment could be made.  Two trials have been completed by the Court, and two 
trials are currently in progress, including the trial of former Liberian President Charles 
Taylor in the Hague. 30  Charges against indicted individuals before the Court include acts 
                                                 
21 The RUF traces its history to the late 1980s when students in Sierra Leone grew disgruntled over 
unemployment rates and the suppression of new ideas.  These youth became involved with gangs, drugs, 
and violence.  In 1987 and 1988, 25 to 50 Sierra Leoneans were trained in revolutionary tactics in Libya.  
Three of these members would later be involved in the RUF.  In 1991, before general elections could be 
held, the RUF and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia attacked the borders of Sierra Leone with the 
purpose of ending the twenty-four year term of power of the All People’s Congress.  The weakness of the 
Sierra Leone military allowed the RUF to take control of large portions of the country after a few days.  
Global Security, Military: Revolutionary United Front, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ruf.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2009).   
22 See Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of 
Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/1999/777/Annex (July 7, 1999) [hereinafter Lomé Peace Accord], available at 
http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html.  Article 1 dictates the terms of the cease-fire agreement: 
“The armed conflict between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL is hereby ended with 
immediate effect.  Accordingly, the two sides shall ensure that a total and permanent cessation of hostilities 
is observed forthwith.”  Id. art. 1. 
23  Id. art. 9. 
24 Id. arts. 6(2)(ix), 26. 
25 ICTJ website Sierra Leone, supra note 19. 
26Id.  In May 2000, 500 UN peacekeepers were captured.  Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id.  In 2007, the Special Court for Sierra Leone began prosecuting its most important case to date, that of 
Liberian President Charles Ghankay Taylor.  During his leadership, many of the human rights violations 
occurred in Sierra Leone.  The trial of President Taylor is currently still in progress.  Id. 
29 See Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of 
a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2002/246/Annex (Jan. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Joint 
Agreement] available at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/SpecialCourtAgreementFinal.pdf.   
30 See Special Court for Sierra Leone, About the Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-
sl.org/ABOUT/tabid/70/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2009).  On March 7, 2003, the Special Court 
Vol. 7:1] Christopher D. Totten 
 7
of terror, enslavement, sexual slavery, conscription of children into militias, attacks on 
humanitarian workers, and many other serious war crimes. 
¶16 The Agreement for a Special Court between the Sierra Leone government and the 
United Nations [the “Agreement”] was in response to UN Resolution 1315, which 
expressed the current grave situation in Sierra Leone.31  The Agreement includes twenty-
three articles that establish a working framework for the Special Court.  For example, 
Article 5 of the Agreement states that: “The Government [of Sierra Leone] shall assist in 
the provision of premises for the Special Court and such utilities, facilities and other 
services as may be necessary for its operation.”32  While the Special Court is an 
independent body, it still requires various forms of assistance from Sierra Leone and 
other individual countries.33 
¶17 Under Article 1, the Agreement establishes that if Sierra Leone cannot or will not 
investigate or prosecute a certain case, the UN Security Council can authorize the Special 
Court to do so.34  Under Article 8, even though Sierra Leone courts and the Special Court 
have concurrent jurisdiction (e.g., “shared” jurisdiction), the Special Court is still able to 
formally request that a Sierra Leone court defer a case to it.35  As a result, there are two 
ways in which the Special Court can acquire jurisdiction over particular cases: (1) if the 
Sierra Leone court is unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute a case and the UN 
formally authorizes the Special Court to exert jurisdiction over that case;36 and (2) if the 
Special Court formally requests to have jurisdiction over a particular case.37 
¶18 In addition, the Agreement addresses the prosecution of juvenile offenders.  
Article 7 states that no child under fifteen (15) at the time of his or her crime will be open 
to prosecution by the Special Court.38  While there is no formal prohibition against the 
                                                                                                                                                 
indicted three RUF leaders: Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine Gbao.  All three face a “17-
count indictment for crimes against humanity, violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions 
and of Additional Protocol II (commonly known as war crimes), and other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. ”  (An 18th count was later added).  Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
Summary of Charges Against the RUF Accused, http://www.sc-
sl.org/CASES/RevolutionaryUnitedFrontTrialRUF/RUFSummaryoftheCharges/tabid/185/Default.aspx 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2009).  The Special Court for Sierra Leone has the ability to try the following crimes: 
crimes against humanity, violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional 
Protocol II, other serious violations of international human rights law and certain crimes under the law of 
Sierra Leone.  See Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone art. 2-5, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138 
[hereinafter Special Court Statute], available at 
http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/SpecialCourtStatuteFinal.pdf.   
31 See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (stating, in part, that the Security Council is 
“[d]eeply concerned at the very serious crimes committed within the territory of Sierra Leone against the 
people of Sierra Leone and United Nations and associated personnel and at the prevailing situation of 
impunity”).   
32 Joint Agreement, supra note 29, art. 5; see also Special Court Statute, supra note 30.   
33 See Joint Agreement, supra note 29, art. 17; Special Court for Sierra Leone, Home, http://www.sc-sl.org 
(last visited Jan. 19th, 2009) (noting that the Special Court receives both monetary and in kind assistance 
from over forty  individual countries, which is provided on a voluntary basis). 
34 Special Court Statute, supra note 30, art. 1(3) (“In the event the sending State [e.g., Sierra Leone] is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out an investigation or prosecution, the Court may, if authorized by 
the Security Council on the proposal of any State, exercise jurisdiction over such persons.”). 
35 Id. art. 8. 
36 Id. art. 1(3). 
37 Id. art. 8(2). 
38 Id. art. 7(1) (“The Special Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of 15 
at the time of the alleged commission of the crime. Should any person who was at the time of the alleged 
commission of the crime between 15 and 18 years of age come before the Court, he or she shall be treated 
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prosecution of children between the ages of 15 and 18 in the Special Court, the Statute 
appears to favor alternative approaches to the handling of these cases.39  A child between 
the ages of 15 and 18, “shall be treated with dignity and a sense of worth, taking into 
account his or her young age and the desirability of promoting his or her rehabilitation.”40  
In particular, the Special Court may direct juvenile offenders into community service and 
foster care programs.41  Notably, Article 15 of the Special Court Statute directs the 
Special Court Prosecutor to utilize truth and reconciliation commissions for the resolution 
of disputes involving juveniles to the extent they are available.42 
¶19 Regarding amnesty, Article 10 of the Agreement declares that any amnesty given 
for crimes that fall within the Special Court’s jurisdiction will not be a bar to 
prosecution.43  This provision ensured that the amnesty given under the Lomé Agreement 
would not be honored by the Special Court. 
2. Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
¶20 The Lomé Peace Agreement established the TRC on July 7, 1999.44  The TRC 
was charged with creating an impartial historical record of past human rights violations.45  
In addition, the Commission investigated particular violations, and worked to restore the 
                                                                                                                                                 
with dignity and a sense of worth, taking into account his or her young age and the desirability of 
promoting his or her rehabilitation, reintegration into and assumption of a constructive role in society, and 
in accordance with international human rights standards, in particular the rights of the child.”). 
39 Id. art. 7(2) (“In the disposition of a case against a juvenile offender, the Special Court shall order any of 
the following: care guidance and supervision orders, community service orders, counseling, foster care, 
correctional, educational and vocational training programmes, approved schools and, as appropriate, any 
programmes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or programmes of child protection 
agencies.”). 
40Id. art. 7(1).  
41 Id. art. 7(2). 
42 Id. art. 15(5) ( “In the prosecution of juvenile offenders, the Prosecutor shall ensure that the child-
rehabilitation programme is not placed at risk and that, where appropriate, resort should be had to 
alternative truth and reconciliation mechanisms, to the extent of their availability.”). 
43 Id. art. 10 (“An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court in 
respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.”). 
44 Lomé Peace Accord, supra note 22. 
The CCP [Commission for the Consolidation of Peace] shall ensure that all structures for national reconciliation 
and the consolidation of peace already in existence and those provided for in the present Agreement are operational 
and given the necessary resources for realizing their respective mandates. These structures shall comprise: (i) the 
Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development; (ii) the Joint 
Monitoring Commission; (iii) the Provincial and District Cease-fire Monitoring Committees; (iv) the Committee for 
the Release of Prisoners of War and Non-Combatants; (v) the Committee for Humanitarian Assistance; (vi) the 
National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration; (vii) the National Commission for 
Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction; (viii) the Human Rights Commission; and (ix) the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. 
Id. art 6(2). 
45 The Truth and Reconciliation Act of 2000, Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette, Vol. CXXXI, No. 9 
(Feb. 10, 2000) § 6(1) [hereinafter Sierra Leone TRC Act], available at 
http://www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/charters/tc_sierra_leone_02102000.html (“The object for which the 
Commission is established is to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human 
rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning 
of the Conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement; to address impunity; to respond to the 
needs of the victims; to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and 
abuses suffered.”). 
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dignity of victims.46  To realize its goals, the TRC held numerous sessions where it heard 
testimony from both victims and perpetrators.47  Information could be provided to the 
TRC in confidence.48  Regarding explicit, pre-established norms for interaction between 
the TRC and the Special Court in Sierra Leone, these were limited to a stated preference 
for relying upon alternative mechanisms like the TRC for the handling of cases involving 
juveniles under eighteen (18) years of age.49 
C. East Timor 
¶21 This section provides an overview of the human rights crisis in East Timor before 
it turns its attention to the Serious Crimes Investigation Unit (SCU) and the Commission 
for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (CAVR) in East Timor. 
¶22 Indonesia annexed East Timor by force in 1975.  For twenty-four years after the 
annexation, Indonesia engaged in brutal violence to suppress nationalist guerrillas in East 
Timor.50  During this time period, many severe human rights violations occurred.51  This 
situation resulted in the death of 200,000 individuals, or one-third of the country’s 
population.52  In August 1999, Indonesia accepted that the citizens of East Timor would 
hold a referendum to discuss the future of the country.53 
                                                 
46 Id. § 6(2). 
47 The TRC is responsible for taking additional statements or gathering additional information to support its 
findings.  
The Commission shall, subject to this Act, solely determine its operating procedures and mode of work with 
regard to its functions which shall include the following three components: – (a) undertaking investigation and 
research into key events, causes, patterns of abuse or violation and the parties responsible; (b) holding sessions, 
some of which may be public, to hear from the victims and perpetrators of any abuses or violations or from other 
interested parties; and (c) taking individual statements and gathering additional information with regard to the 
matters referred to in paragraphs (a) or (b). 
Id. § 7(1) 
48 Id. § 7(3) (“At the discretion of the Commission, any person shall be permitted to provide information to 
the Commission on a confidential basis and the Commission shall not be compelled to disclose any 
information given to it in confidence.”).  But see Special Court Agreement (Ratification) Act 2002, 
Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette, Vol. CXXXIII, No. 22 (Apr. 25, 2002) § 21(2) (“Notwithstanding 
any other law, every natural person, corporation, or other body created by or under Sierra Leone law shall 
comply with any direction specified in an order of the Special Court”).  Various commentators have noted 
the apparent conflict between these two provisions.  See, e.g., Marieke Wierda, Priscilla Hayner & Paul van 
Zyl, Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, Exploring the Relationship Between the Special Court and the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, at 4-5, (June 24, 2002) [hereinafter Exploring the 
Relationship], available at http://www.ictj.org/images/content/0/8/084.pdf; William Schabas, A Synergistic 
Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, in TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND COURTS, 3, 25-41 (William A. Schabas & Shane Darcy eds., 2004) 
[hereinafter Schabas, TRC]. 
49 Special Court Statute, supra note 30, art. 15(5). 
50 Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, Timor-Leste, http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region3/628.html (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2009) [hereinafter ICTJ website Timor-Leste] (“For 24 years, [East Timor] suffered the 
effects of brutal counter-insurgency tactics used against nationalist guerillas.”). 
51 Caitlin Reiger & Marieke Wierda, Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, The Serious Crimes Process in 
Timor-Leste: In Retrospect, at 5, (Mar. 2006), available at 
http://www.ictj.org/static/Prosecutions/Timor.study.pdf.  These human rights violations included the torture 
of members of the resistance, disappearances, rapes, theft of land, forced marriages, forced sterilizations, 
frequent massacres, and the general intimidation of the public.  One of the massacres in 1991 included 
hundreds of unarmed protesters in a funeral procession.  Id. 
52 Id. at 4.  A large portion of these deaths result not only from military oppression but from disease and 
forced starvation as well.  Id. 
53 ICTJ website Timor-Leste, supra note 50. The fall of the authoritarian regime led by General Soeharto 
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¶23 After East Timor voted for its independence in 1999, the Indonesian National 
Army and the militias in East Timor that supported Indonesia again responded with 
extreme violence.  Using aggression and arson, these forces killed approximately 2,000 
individuals and caused another 500,000 to evacuate their homes.54  This crisis came to an 
end only as a result of UN involvement.55  In 2002, East Timor finally achieved its goal 
of becoming an independent territory.56 
1. Serious Crimes Investigation Unit (SCU) 
¶24 The United Nations established the United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor (UNTAET) on October 25, 1999.57  The creation of UNTAET aimed to 
facilitate East Timor’s transition to independence after the vote by the territory’s people.  
Specifically, UNTAET exercised both legislative and executive authority during a critical 
time period, and supported the establishment of self-government in East Timor.58  As a 
result, East Timor achieved its independence on May 20, 2002.59 
¶25 Though UNTAET ceased to exist once East Timor gained its independence,60 the 
UN immediately established a Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) in order to 
continue supporting the new country’s security and stability.61  UN Resolution 1410 
provided the framework and goals for UNMISET,62 which were similar to those of 
UNTAET.  The United Nations Security Council decided that the mandate of UNMISET 
would consist of three major aspects.  These include providing assistance to 
administrative structures, establishing an interim law enforcement agency, and 
contributing to the maintenance of security in East Timor.63 
                                                                                                                                                 
sparked this referendum.  Seventy-eight percent of Timor-Leste’s citizens voted for independence from 
Indonesia.  Id. 
54 Global Policy Forum, Ad-Hoc Court for East Timor, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/etimorindx.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2009). 
55 ICTJ website Timor-Leste, supra note 50 (explaining that United Nations troops intervened and the UN 
formed the transitional authority UNTAET). 
56 Id.  
57 See United Nations, East Timor-UNTAET Background, http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2009) (“[O]n 25 October, the United Nations Security Council, by resolution 1272 
(1999), established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) as an 
integrated, multidimentional [sic] peacekeeping operation fully responsible for the administration of East 
Timor during its transition to independence.”).  
58 See id. (“Resolution 1272 mandated UNTAET to provide security and maintain law and order throughout 
the territory of East Timor; to establish an effective administration; to assist in the development of civil and 
social services; to ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation of 
humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance; to support capacity-building for self-
government; and to assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.”). 
59 See United Nations, United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), 
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/etimor.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2009). 
60 See United Nations, UNTAET Facts and Figures, http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetF.htm (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2009). 
61 See United Nations, United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor Background, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmiset/background.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2009). The resolution 
creating this UN involvement was unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council on May 17, 2002. Id. 
62 See S.C. Res. 1410, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1410 (May 17, 2002).  The Security Council “decides to establish, 
as of 20 May 2002 and for an initial period of 12 months, a United Nations Mission of Support in East 
Timor (UNMISET).” Id. ¶ 1.  
63 Id. ¶ 2(a)–(c) (“[UNMISET is] (a) [t]o provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the 
viability and political stability of East Timor; (b) [t]o provide interim law enforcement and public security 
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¶26 From an organizational standpoint, UNMISET consists of a Special 
Representative appointed by the Secretary-General to head UNMISET, a Serious Crimes 
Unit (SCU), a Civilian Support Group, and a Human Rights Unit.64  UNMISET also 
includes a sizeable civilian police force as well as a military force.65 
¶27 The SCU, the prosecutorial authority of UNMISET, has indicted 395 individuals 
for serious crimes including crimes against humanity.  The Unit has obtained 84 
successful convictions. 66  The UN, in a document entitled “Policy on Justice and Return 
Procedures in East Timor,” stated its procedures for offenders who wish to return to East 
Timor.  Those offenders who have committed serious crimes are directed to the SCU.67  
Serious offenses committed in East Timor will be handled by East Timor’s justice 
system, primarily the SCU.68 
2. Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (CAVR) 
¶28 The United Nations, under UNTAET, established CAVR in 2001.69  CAVR 
examined the facts behind the human rights violations that occurred between 1974 and 
1999 in East Timor.70  The objectives of CAVR require the commission to inquire about 
human rights violations, determine the nature of the offenses, and determine the practices 
                                                                                                                                                 
and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in East Timor, the East Timor Police 
Service (ETPS); (c) [t]o contribute to the maintenance of the external and internal security of East 
Timor.”). 
64 Id. ¶ 3–3(a) (“[UNMISET will consist of a] civilian component comprising an office of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General with focal points for gender and HIV/AIDS, a Civilian Support 
Group of up to 100 personnel filling core functions, a Serious Crimes Unit and a Human Rights Unit.”). 
65 Id. ¶ 3(b)–(c) (“[UNMISET shall consist of a] civilian police component initially comprised of 1,250 
officers [and a] military component with an initial strength of up to 5,000 troops including 120 military 
observers.”). 
66 ICTJ website Timor-Leste, supra note 50. The convictions were mainly low level offenders.  The 
majority of those indicted still remain outside of East Timor in Indonesia while the Indonesian government 
refuses to cooperate.  In some cases, the Indonesian government has held biased trials for some of the 
suspects.  While the SCU technically completed its work in May of 2005 (at the end of its mandate), a UN 
Serious Crimes Investigation Team (SCIT) has formed in its place to investigate grave crimes committed in 
East Timor in 1999. The actual prosecution of any crimes uncovered by SCIT, however, will be determined 
by the local Timorese prosecutor-general.  Id.  See also UC Berkeley War Crimes Study Ctr, East Timor, 
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~warcrime/ET.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2009) (explaining that the SCU 
completed a total of fifty-five (55) trials, wherein, eighty-four (84) individuals were convicted and three (3) 
were acquitted).  Note that “[a]ll charges brought by the SCU are [actually] tried before one of the Special 
Panels of Serious Crimes, which each consist of two international judges and one East Timorese judge.” 
Website of the Serious Crimes Unit, 
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~warcrime/Serious%20Crimes%20Unit%20Files/default.html (last visited Jan. 
19, 2009). 
67 See UNTAET, Policy on Justice and Return Procedures in East Timor, Mar. 25, 2002, available at 
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/DB/procedures.pdf.  Part B of these procedures addresses those who have 
committed serious crimes during a particular period in 1999.  Id. at pt. B (“A ‘serious crime’, for these 
purposes, includes acts such as murder, torture, sexual offences and large-scale crimes (e.g. organised 
destruction of property) committed between 1 January and 25 October 1999 as well as other Crimes 
Against Humanity.”). 
68 Id. (“Serious crimes will be dealt with by East Timor’s criminal justice system, in particular the Serious 
Crimes Unit, which is charged with investigating and prosecuting serious crimes, and the Special Panels 
for Serious Crimes at the Dili District Court.”). 
69 See UNTAET, Regulation No. 2001/10, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2001/10 (July 13, 2001) [hereinafter 
CAVR Mandate], available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/Reg10e.pdf.  “There shall be 
established a Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation.”  Id. § 2.1.  
70 ICTJ website Timor-Leste, supra note 50. 
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and policies that led to these violations.  CAVR must refer to the prosecutor all offenses 
that CAVR deems appropriate, along with suggestions for prosecution.71  CAVR shall 
also promote human rights, promote reconciliation, and help to restore the dignity of 
victims.  One final objective of CAVR involved the re-integration of individuals into 
their communities who harmed those communities in some way through minor criminal 
or non-criminal offenses.72 
¶29 The CAVR mandate included a Community Reconciliation Process (CRP) to 
assist individuals in re-integrating into their communities.73  In particular, individuals 
responsible for less serious criminal or non-criminal acts could participate in the CRP by 
providing a statement that includes a description of their actions, an admission of 
responsibility for these acts, and a renunciation of the use of violence.74  To determine 
eligibility to participate in the CRP, CAVR considers the nature of the acts committed, 
the total number of acts, and the individual’s role in the crime.  Serious criminal offenses 
are specifically excluded from consideration for CRP.75  Prior to beginning CRP, clients 
must be informed that their statements will be given to the Office of the General 
Prosecutor and their statements may be used against them in future legal proceedings.76 
                                                 
71 See CAVR Mandate, supra note 69, § 3.1(e) (stating as an objective “the referral of human rights 
violations to the Office of the General Prosecutor with recommendations for the prosecution of offences 
where appropriate”). 
72 Id. § 3.1(h).  The nine objectives of the Commission include:  
(a) inquiring into human rights violations that have taken place in the context of the political conflicts in East 
Timor; (b) establishing the truth regarding past human rights violations; (c) reporting the nature of the human 
rights violations that have occurred and identifying the factors that may have led to such violations; (d) 
identifying practices and policies, whether of State or non-State actors which need to be addressed to prevent 
future recurrences of human rights violations; (e) the referral of human rights violations to the Office of the 
General Prosecutor with recommendations for the prosecution of offences where appropriate; (f) assisting in 
restoring the human dignity of victims; (g) promoting reconciliation; (h) supporting the reception and 
reintegration of individuals who have caused harm to their communities through the commission of minor 
criminal offences and other harmful acts through the facilitation of community based mechanisms for 
reconciliation; and (i) the promotion of human rights. 
Id. § 3.1. 
73 Id. § 22.1. (“In seeking to assist the reception and reintegration of persons into their communities, the 
Commission may facilitate Community Reconciliation Processes . . . in relation to criminal or non-criminal 
acts committed within the context of the political conflicts in East Timor between 25 April 1974 and 25 
October 1999 considered appropriate by the Commission under Section 24.” 
74 Id. § 23.1. This section states:  
A person responsible for the commission of a criminal or non-criminal act (hereinafter: the Deponent) who 
wishes to participate in a Community Reconciliation Process in respect of such act must submit a written statement 
to the Commission. This statement must contain the following: (a) a full description of the relevant acts; (b) an 
admission of responsibility for such acts; (c) a explanation [sic] of the association of such acts with the political 
conflicts in East Timor; (d) an identification of the specific community in which the Deponent wishes to undertake a 
process of reconciliation and reintegration (hereinafter: the Community of Reception); (e) a request to participate in 
a Community Reconciliation Process; (f) a renunciation of the use of violence to achieve political objectives; and 
(g) the signature or other identifying mark of the Deponent.  
Id. 
75 Id. at sched. 1. The criteria for an individual to be involved with the CRP include: 
(1) The nature of the crime committed by the Deponent: for example, offences such as theft, minor assault, arson 
(other than that resulting in death or injury), the killing of livestock or destruction of crops might be appropriate 
cases to form the subject of a Community Reconciliation Process. (2) The total number of acts which the 
Deponent committed. (3) The Deponent's role in the commission of the crime, that is, whether the Deponent 
organised, planned, instigated or ordered the crime or was following the orders of others in carrying out the 
crime. (4) In no circumstances shall a serious criminal offence be dealt with in a Community Reconciliation 
Process.” Id. 
76 Id. § 23.3 (“Prior to the Commission accepting a statement under this Section, the Deponent must be 
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¶30 After CAVR deliberates based upon the individual’s statements before the CRP, 
CAVR must inform the individual of the outcome and suggest an appropriate form of 
reconciliation.  Acts of reconciliation may include community service, reparations, a 
public apology, or other acts of contrition.77  The outcome of CRP as well as the 
suggestions for reconciliation made by CAVR form the basis of a final reconciliation 
agreement issued by CAVR.  Information may be provided to CAVR on a confidential 
basis.  If information is provided in this way, it must remain confidential except if 
requested by the Office of the General Prosecutor.78  Finally, for an individual to be 
eligible to participate in CRP, that individual’s particular acts had to be committed as part 
of the political crisis in East Timor between April 25, 1974 and October 25, 1999.79 
¶31 CAVR, CRP and the prosecutorial arm of the United Nations, including the 
Office of the General Prosecutor and SCU, coexisted while respecting each other’s 
specific jurisdictional reach and functions.80  For example, before all CAVR hearings, the 
Office of the General Prosecutor was required to consider the case and agree that it 
should proceed through the CRP instead of being submitted for prosecution to the SCU or 
a similar prosecutorial body (i.e., as a result of constituting a serious crime).  In addition, 
the final reconciliation agreement issued by CAVR as a result of a perpetrator’s 
participation in CRP could take the form of a court order, which would allow for the 
perpetrator's immunity from prosecution by the SCU as long as the perpetrator fulfilled 
the terms of the reconciliation agreement.81  Cases determined by the Prosecutor to be 
eligible for prosecution by the SCU, however, were not always prosecuted.82   This 
allowed many serious offenders to go unpunished while less serious offenders voluntarily 
subjected themselves to what was often a humiliating process before the CRP.83 
D. Strengths and Weaknesses of CAVR (East Timor) and TRC (Sierra Leone) 
¶32 Both the truth commissions in East Timor and in Sierra Leone experienced 
differing degree of success.  For example, in addition to creating an historical record of 
the abuses and providing a forum for perpetrator/ victim testimony, the Sierra Leone 
Truth Commission proposed various recommendations to the government of Sierra 
Leone.84  These recommendations led directly to the creation of a UN mission in Sierra 
                                                                                                                                                 
informed that a copy of the statement will be sent to the Office of the General Prosecutor and that its 
contents might be used against him or her in a court of law should the Office of the General Prosecutor 
choose to exercise jurisdiction. Only in circumstances where the Deponent indicates acceptance of this 
process and annotates the statement accordingly shall the statement be accepted by the Commission.”). 
77 Id. § 27.7 (“Following the CRP Hearing, the CRP Panel shall deliberate upon the act of reconciliation 
which it considers most appropriate for the Deponent and inform the Deponent of the outcome of their 
deliberations. The act of reconciliation may include: (a) community service; (b) reparation; (c) public 
apology; and/or (d) other act of contrition.”). 
78 Id. § 44.2 (“At the discretion of the Commission, any person shall be permitted to provide information to 
the Commission on a confidential basis. The Commission shall not be compelled to release information, 
except on request of the Office of the General Prosecutor.”). 
79 Id. § 22.1. 
80 See CAVR, Chega!: The CAVR Report, at pt 9, ¶ 34, (2006) [hereinafter CAVR Report], available at 
http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/chegaFiles/finalReportEng/09-Community-Reconciliation.pdf. 
81 Id. at pt. 9, ¶ 5. 
82 Id. at pt. 9, ¶170 (stating that at the time of the final report, less than half of cases reported had been 
addressed). 
83   Id. (indicating that this situation led to unequal accountability and a lack of a sense of justice). 
84  ICTJ website Sierra Leone, supra note 19. 
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Leone, a Human Rights Commission, and various civil society groups charged with the 
task of implementing Truth Commission recommendations.85  At the same time, however, 
there was a notable dearth in pre-established guidelines, or understandings, for how the 
Sierra Leone Truth Commission and Special Court were to interact, or co-exist, including 
how they shared information, how far their respective jurisdictions would reach (one 
notable exception perhaps being the handling of cases involving juvenile offenders), and 
how a dispute subject to resolution, or resolved, in one forum would be treated by the 
other forum. 
¶33 On the other hand, the East Timor truth commission succeeded in the sense of 
reintegrating less serious offenders back into communities, and allowing communities to 
evaluate their own role in the human rights conflict.86  However, the commission 
disappointed many community members by not being able to accommodate everyone 
who wished to participate in the reintegration process.  Other related benefits provided by 
the reintegration process included giving communities an opportunity to celebrate the end 
of the conflict, training the East Timorese in arbitration methods, enforcing the value of 
the rule of law, providing an alternate means to justice, supporting the idea of 
forgiveness, and promoting future reintegration.87  Although 1,400 cases were completed 
through the reintegration process, it is estimated that another 3,000 perpetrators could 
have participated if it had continued.88 
¶34 Significantly, in contrast to the truth commission experience in Sierra Leone, the 
East Timor truth commission framework provided for a number of guidelines for how the 
commission was to interact with the prosecutorial arm of the UN (e.g., the Office of the 
Prosecutor and the SCU).  For example, serious human rights abusers bypassed CAVR 
and CRP and went directly to the prosecutorial arm.  In addition, various aspects of 
information exchange between CAVR/ CRP and the prosecutorial arm had been pre-
arranged, including the exchange of confidential information.  Finally, perpetrator/victim 
disputes resolved successfully by CAVR/ CRP (as evidenced by a perpetrator’s 
fulfillment of the terms of a reconciliation agreement) were not subject to prosecution by 
the SCU, or a similar prosecutorial body. 
E. The International Criminal Court:  History and Structure89 
¶35 The ad hoc tribunal created in Nuremberg after World War II set a precedent, in 
part, for the international community to hold individuals responsible for grave crimes.90  
The ad hoc criminal tribunals established by the United Nations to address the crises in 
the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda continued the pattern of holding individuals 
responsible for grave breaches of human rights law.91  Certain nations, however, 
                                                 
85  Id.  
86  CAVR Report, supra note 80, at pt. 9, ¶ 164. 
87 Id.  
88 Id. ¶ 167. 
89 See Totten & Tyler, supra note 5, at 1073-76.  
90  See generally Frederic Megret, Epilogue to an Endless Debate: The International Criminal Court’s 
Third Party Jurisdiction and the Looming Revolution of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 247 (2001).  
Nuremberg dictum stating “crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities” 
has been used to affirm individual criminal responsibility for international crimes.  Id. at 263 (citing The 
Trial of German Major War Criminals Sitting at Nuremberg, Judgment, 41-42 (1946).  
91 See Statute of the International Tribunal, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter ICTY Statute], 
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recognized the need for a single, permanent court for the trial of these breaches because 
of the effort and cost, associated with the continual establishment of ad hoc tribunals in 
response to each period of grave human rights violations.92 
¶36 The ICC was to be the first court established in advance of, rather than in 
response to, international human rights violations.93  In constructing the definitions of 
crimes that would fall within the Court’s jurisdiction, nations relied upon the statutes for 
the two regional criminal courts: the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).94 
¶37 In July of 1998, the Rome Statute was adopted at the UN Diplomatic Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, also known 
as the Rome Conference.95  On July 1, 2002, the Rome Statute entered into force after 
ratification by sixty State Parties.96  A fundamental concept included in the Rome Statute 
                                                                                                                                                 
available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept08_en.pdf. “The International 
Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the 
provisions of the present Statute.”  Id. art. 1 (emphasis added).  Articles 2–5 contain definitions for crimes 
within the jurisdiction, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.  Id. arts. 2-5; see also 
Statute of the International  Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, November 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1602 [hereinafter 
ICTR Statute], available at http://www.un.org/ictr/statute.html. Article 1 states: 
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations 
committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, in accordance with the 
provisions of the present Statute. 
Id. art. 1.   
Articles 2-4 define the related crimes within the jurisdiction.  Id. arts. 2-4.  
92  Mahnoush H. Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, The Law-in-Action of the International Criminal 
Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L. L. 385, 402 (2005). 
93  Previous ad hoc “tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, may be called ex post tribunals, in that they are 
established after the acute and violent situation in which the alleged crimes occurred . . . .  [E]x ante 
tribunals . . . are established before an international security problem has been resolved or even manifested 
itself . . . .  The ICC is the archetypal ex ante tribunal.”  The ICC, as a permanent court, will deal with 
problems at times while they are still occurring.  Id. at 385. 
94 For example, Article 6 of the Rome Statute, which defines genocide, contains text identical to that of 
Article 4(2) of the ICTY Statute.  Compare Rome Statute, infra note 95, art. 6 (“‘[G]enocide’ means any of 
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or 
religious group, as such: [listing relevant acts].”), with ICTY Statute, supra note 91, art. 4(2) (identical 
language and listing relevant acts identical to those in the Rome Statute).  Also, the listed acts in Article 7 
of the Rome Statute, which defines crimes against humanity, is similar to the listed crimes against humanity 
in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute.  Exceptions are Rome Statute Article 7(1)(d), which adds “forcible transfer 
of population,” (1)(e), which adds other severe deprivations of liberty, (1)(g), which outlines additional sex 
crimes, (1)(h) which expands the definition of groups to be protected from persecution, and the additions of 
(1)(i) enforced disappearances and (j) apartheid.  Compare Rome Statute, infra note 95, art. 7, with ICTY 
Statute, supra note 91, art. 5.  Furthermore, Article 8 of the Rome Statute incorporates grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 into its definition of war crimes.  Rome Statute, infra note 95, art. 8.  
Similarly, the ICTR and ICTY Statutes also criminalize grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.  See 
ICTR Statute, supra note 911, art. 4 (“Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of 
Additional Protocol II”); ICTY Statute, supra note 911, art. 2 (“Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949”). 
95 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome 
Statute], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf.  
The Rome Statute is an international treaty.  However, because it is a treaty that establishes an institution—
the International Criminal Court—it is referred to as a statute.  See id. at pmbl., art. 1. 
96 Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 126(1) (“This Statute shall enter into force on the first day of the month 
after the 60th day following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.”).  Following the adoption of the 
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is the concept of complementarity, whereby the ICC must respect and defer to an 
individual nation’s investigation, or prosecution, of a criminal suspect who happens to 
also be of interest to the ICC.  This respect, or deference, is only applicable, however, if 
the individual nation exhibits both an ability and willingness to investigate or prosecute 
the particular suspect.97 
¶38 The International Criminal Court is comprised of the Presidency, an Appeals 
Chamber, the Trial Chamber, the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Office of the Prosecutor 
(Prosecutor’s Office), and the Registry.98  Judges are nominated and confirmed by the 
Assembly of State Parties (Assembly), and they are required to represent diverse 
geographic, gender, and legal backgrounds.99  The Prosecutor is also nominated and 
confirmed by the Assembly.  Critically, he or she has the independence to operate the 
Prosecutor’s Office as a separate organ of the Court.100  The Registry is responsible for all 
non-judicial aspects of the Court, including the Victims and Witnesses Unit that provides 
security and assistance for individuals testifying before the Court.101  Although 
independent of the UN, the ICC does have an agreement of cooperation with the UN 
whereby both parties agree to exchange information and assist each other in various 
ways.102  Funding is provided by the State Parties, the UN, and donations from non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and private donors.103 
F. The International Criminal Court (ICC) and Sudan 
¶39 The UN Security Council referred the Sudanese case to the ICC in March of 
2005.104  This referral occurred as a result of the serious violations of international human 
rights law in the Darfur region of Sudan.  These violations, perpetrated by the Sudanese 
government and an affiliated militia known as the “Janjaweed,” include the killing of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rome Statute at the Rome Conference in 1998, the Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002 with 
the necessary number of countries having deposited ratifications to the UN  Coalition for the International 
Criminal Court, History of the ICC, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=icchistory (last visited Jan. 5, 2009).  On 
July 18, 2008, Cook Islands acceded  to the Rome Statute, bringing the total number of State Parties to 108.  
Coalition for the International Criminal Court, State Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC as of July 18, 
2008, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/RATIFICATIONSbyRegion_18_July-08.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 
2009). 
97  Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 17(1)(a).  The complementarity principle is defined in its entirety in 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute. See infra, note 118.     
98 Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 34. 
99 Id. art. 36(4), (6)-(8).  The Assembly consists of one representative for each State Party.  Id. art. 112(1). 
100 Id. art. 42(1), (4).  The Prosecutor can be removed by a vote of the Assembly if there is evidence of 
misconduct.  Id. art. 46. 
101 Id. art. 43. 
102 Id. art. 2; Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and United 
Nations, U.N. Doc. A/58/874/Annex (Aug. 20, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-
ASP-3-Res1_English.pdf.  The negotiated agreement between the UN and the ICC is a basic agreement of 
mutual acknowledgment of status.  Both organs agree to the exchange of information and cooperation in 
fulfilling their respective mandates.  Relationship Agreement, supra, arts. 2, 5. UN officials are also 
permitted under the Agreement to testify before the Court if necessary.  Id. art. 16. 
103 Rome Statute, supra note 95, arts. 115–16. 
104 S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 3.  In addition to referral by the UN Security Council, there are two other 
ways cases can be brought before the ICC: 1) State Parties to the ICC may refer cases to the ICC, and 2) the 
Prosecutor may refer a case as a result of an independent investigation.  See Rome Statute, supra note 95, 
arts. 13–15. 
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civilians, massacres, rape, looting, and other crimes against humanity and war crimes.105  
Upon the referral of the Sudanese case by the U.N, the ICC Prosecutor initiated an 
investigation into the situation in Darfur.  The Prosecutor determined that there was 
sufficient evidence to request arrest warrants for two individuals involved in committing 
atrocities in Darfur.106  The Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC granted these requests in April 
of 2007, and issued the warrants for two Sudanese suspects.107  Though Sudan has a legal 
obligation to turn over these suspects to the ICC for prosecution,108 it has not done so as 
of yet. 
II. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) DEFERRAL TO A SUDANESE TRUTH 
COMMISSION 
¶40 After exploring the international community’s support for a Sudanese truth 
commission, this Part argues that the International Criminal Court (ICC) would not have 
to defer to a Sudanese truth commission, and therefore could continue its prosecution of 
individuals for grave crimes committed in the Sudan.  This argument has three principle 
bases for support:  (1) the prosecution of high-level Sudanese suspects is in the “interests 
of justice;” (2) the Sudan has not shown a willingness to try suspects of human rights 
abuses in an impartial, independent fashion; and (3) prosecution by the ICC of Sudanese 
suspects is not a threat to international peace and security. 
¶41 As in other countries where the ICC is investigating, the likelihood of a future 
Sudanese truth commission seems particularly high in light of the international 
community’s continued insistence on the need for such a commission.  In particular, the 
UN and prominent human rights groups have called for the development of a truth 
commission in the Sudan.109  In a post-conflict Sudanese society, the UN, African Union 
(AU), and other groups, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), may assist 
the Sudan in formulating such a commission. 
¶42 Notably, the formation of a truth commission in the Sudan is unlikely to lead to a 
decision by the ICC Prosecutor not to prosecute any particular Sudanese suspect.  There 
                                                 
105 Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the United Nations Secretary-General, § I(VI), U.N. Doc. 
S/2005/60 (Jan. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Report on Darfur], available at 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf.  Under the governing Rome Statute, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide may be prosecuted by the ICC.  See Rome Statute, supra note 95, 
art. 5(1).  In addition, under the Statute, these crimes must be committed either by nationals of a State Party 
to the Statute or alternatively, the crimes themselves must occur in the territory of a State Party.  See id. art 
12(2). Finally, only crimes committed after July 1, 2002, may be prosecuted by the ICC.  See id. art. 11.   
106 Int’l Criminal Court, Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58(7), ICC-02/05-56, at 4, (Feb. 27, 2007), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-05-56_English.pdf (public redacted version) 
[hereinafter Prosecutor’s Application]. 
107 Int’l Criminal Court, Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, ICC-
02/05-01/07, at 42-43, (April 27, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-05-01-07-
1_English.pdf.  These suspects, Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb, have important roles in the government 
and military in the Sudan.  For example, Harun is a government minister, and Kushayb led the Janjaweed, 
the primary militia affiliated with the Sudanese government.  See Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 106, 
at 31–33; see also infra note 111.  The Prosecutor has recently sought an additional arrest warrant for the 
President of the Sudan.  See Al Bashir Press Release, supra note 4. 
108 Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 89(1). 
109 For a description of UN support for a Sudanese truth commission, see supra note 3.  For a description of 
the development of truth commissions in other countries where the ICC is investigating, such as Uganda, 
the Central Africa Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, see supra note 2.   
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are three possible ways that the ICC could defer to a national truth commission such as 
one in the Sudan, and thereby choose not to prosecute a particular suspect.  First, the ICC 
Prosecutor could decide, and the Pre-Trial Chamber could agree, that the investigation 
and prosecution of a suspect is not in the “interests of justice.”110  Given the complicity of 
prominent, high-level Sudanese actors in the grave human rights violations in the 
Sudan,111 and the relative environment of impunity such actors have encountered in the 
Sudan,112 it would generally not be in the interest of justice for the ICC Prosecutor to 
defer to a Sudanese truth commission (e.g., refrain from prosecuting).  This conclusion is 
                                                 
110 Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 53(1). Article 53(1) states: 
The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or her, initiate an investigation 
unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute. In deciding whether to 
initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether: . . . (c) Taking into account the gravity of the 
crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would 
not serve the interests of justice. 
  Id. (emphasis added).  
 Also, Article 53(2) provides: 
If, upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that there is not a sufficient basis for a prosecution because: . . . 
(c) A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances, including the gravity 
of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the 
alleged crime; the Prosecutor shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber and the State making a referral under article 14 
or the Security Council in a case under article 13, paragraph (b), of his or her conclusion and the reasons for the 
conclusion. 
  Id. (2) (emphasis added).   
Note that the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) has the power to request that the Prosecutor reconsider his decision 
not to investigate. Id. art. 53(3)(a).  The PTC also has the power to require the Prosecutor to investigate or 
prosecute a case, even if the Prosecutor had previously concluded it was not in the “interest of justice” to 
do so. Id. art. 53(3)(b). 
111 See Report on Darfur, supra note 105, at 74–77.  According to this Report, the Sudanese government 
has direct ties to the Janjaweed, militia forces responsible for many of the human rights violations 
committed against Sudanese civilians.  For example, the government provides military support to the 
Janjaweed, and even has ordered the militia to attack civilians.  Id.  Prominent members of the Sudanese 
government implicated in the massive human rights violations include Ahmad Harun, who was Minister of 
the Interior in the Sudan and head of the “Darfur Security desk” for the government in 2003 when many of 
the crimes occurred, Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 106, at 31-32, and Sudanese President Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir.  For further information regarding Harun’ s involvement in the crimes in Darfur, see id. 
at 51-69.  For further information regarding Al Bashir’s involvement, see Al Bashir Press Release, supra 
note 4. 
112 As evidence of the current environment of impunity in the Sudan, consider the treatment by the 
Sudanese judicial system of two high-level suspects recently indicted by the ICC Prosecutor (and for whom 
arrests warrants have been issued): Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb.  Kushayb has recently been released 
from prison for “lack of evidence.”  See Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal Court, Sixth Report of the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 
(2005), ¶13, (Dec. 5, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP-RP-20071205-
UNSC-ENG.pdf [hereinafter Sixth Report to the UN Security Council] (“In relation to Ali Kushayb, 
against whom the [Sudanese government] had previously indicated that there were investigations, on 30 
September then Foreign Affairs Minister Lam Akol reportedly stated that he was released for lack of 
evidence”).  Harun has not been subject to any criminal proceedings or been investigated in any way.  See 
id.  ¶ 15 (“All public statements concerning Ahmad Harun indicate that he would neither be surrendered 
nor subject to national proceedings.  The [Sudanese government] has not conducted nor is conducting any 
proceedings in relation to the Prosecution’s case.”).  Moreover, though thirteen (13) national prosecutions 
for Darfur-related crimes have been carried out in the Sudan as of the Spring of 2007, these prosecutions 
were all of low-level criminal suspects. Human Rights Watch, Sudan: National Courts Have Done Nothing 
on Darfur (June 11, 2007), available at http:// 
www.iccnow.org/documents/HRW_SudaneseCourts_Darfur_11june07_eng.pdf.  For a further discussion 
of this environment of impunity, and its impact on the ICC’s ability to continue prosecutions in the Sudan 
despite attempts at national prosecutions there, see generally Totten & Tyler, supra note 5, at 1095-1098. 
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supported by the mission of the ICC itself:  to end cultures of impunity, like the one 
found in the Sudan, through prosecution of individual suspects who commit grave 
crimes.113  In addition, international legal obligations may determine what is in “the 
interests of justice” in the Sudanese context.  For example, there may be an international 
legal obligation for the ICC Prosecutor to pursue certain Sudanese suspects, especially 
those who have committed genocide and certain war crimes such as torture.114  Both of 
these types of crimes have been committed by high-level Sudanese actors, including 
government officials.115  Finally, due to the lack of meaningful and viable alternatives, 
justice in the Sudanese context may be best served through the prosecution of those most 
responsible for grave breaches of international criminal law. For example, local 
prosecutions have not been successful in bringing to justice high-level perpetrators in the 
Sudan.116  It is unclear how a Sudanese truth commission could succeed in this task when 
the judicial system has failed. 
¶43 In addition, the ICC Prosecutor would not be able to prosecute individual, high-
level Sudanese suspects under the principle of complementarity if the Sudan showed a 
willingness and ability to either prosecute or investigate them.  The Sudan has not shown 
such a willingness, however, as evidenced by its refusal to prosecute one ICC suspect 
(Harun), and its release of another from prison without formal prosecution (Kushayb).  In 
fact, to date, the Sudanese judiciary has only tried a small number of low-level suspects 
for Darfur crimes.117  In addition, under the complementarity principle, the ICC 
Prosecutor must defer to a local prosecution or investigation if it is legitimate in nature 
(i.e., not a “show trial” designed to shield an individual from liability or prosecution).118  
                                                 
113 See Rome Statute, supra note 95, at pmbl., paras. 4–5 (“Affirming that the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective 
prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international 
cooperation.  Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes.”). 
114 This obligation stems from both treaty law and international customary law.  For a discussion of 
applicable treaty law, see Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions 
and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 481, 490-91 (2003) (citing Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 4, Dec. 9, 1949, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter 
Genocide Convention]; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 7, Dec. 10 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Times of War arts. 146–47, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 287). For a discussion of international 
customary law supporting a duty to prosecute certain crimes, see Robinson, supra (citing Reservations to 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 
28), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/12/4283.pdf; Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Case No. 
IT-95-17/1-7, Judgment, paras. 137–148, 155 (Dec. 10, 1998)).  See also Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty 
Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 507, 514–521 
(1999) [hereinafter Amnesty Exception] (describing in detail international legal obligation to prosecute 
“grave breaches” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions as well as genocide under the Genocide Convention).     
115 See Al Bashir Press Release, supra note 4. 
116 See supra note 112. 
117 See id.  
118 Rome Statute, supra note 95, at art. 17(2)(a)–(c). The complementarity provision in the Rome Statute 
resides principally in Article 17.  The statute, in pertinent part, states:   
(1) Having regard to paragraph 10 of the preamble and article 1 [establishing the complementarity principle], the 
Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State 
which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution. . . .   
(2) In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the 
principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable: 
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A truth commission proceeding might qualify as a legitimate investigation carried out to 
bring an individual to justice (i.e., through the payment of reparations, public shaming, 
lustration, etc.).119  This would be especially the case if the investigation and proceeding 
by the commission was impartial, conducted without unnecessary delay, included 
participation by both victims and perpetrators, and allowed for various forms of victim 
assistance.120  In the context of the Sudan, however, such a truth commission 
investigation and proceeding applied to high-level perpetrators seems unlikely given both 
the lackluster performance thus far of the Sudanese judiciary in trying prominent Darfur 
suspects, and the refusal of the Sudanese government to execute arrest warrants issued by 
the ICC for several of these suspects.121  Accordingly, the ICC Prosecutor should view 
with suspicion any attempts by the Sudan to make high-level perpetrators immune from 
ICC prosecution under the complementarity principle by subjecting them to a local truth 
commission investigation and proceeding.  (A possible truth commission for the Sudan, 
however, of more limited scope and directed towards low –level perpetrators, will be 
discussed in Part IV of this Article). 
¶44 Note that in other contexts outside the Sudan, analysis of the ICC 
complementarity and interest of justice provisions may proceed differently.  For example, 
victims of the human rights crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have 
expressed interest in a truth commission.122  Should such a commission form in the DRC, 
where the ICC is also investigating and prosecuting individuals, it could perhaps be 
viewed with less skepticism than a similarly situated Sudanese commission.  Unlike in 
the case of the Sudan, the DRC has cooperated with the ICC, in particular with the 
execution of arrest warrants for suspects committing human rights violations.  The DRC 
also referred the violations to the ICC in the first place.123  These types of actions by a 
                                                                                                                                                 
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the 
person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5 
[stating crimes in the Court’s jurisdiction]; (b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the 
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice; (c) The proceedings were not 
or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, 
in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. 
(3) In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or 
substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the 
necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.    
 Id. at art. 17(1)–3. 
119 For further scholarly discussion on whether truth commissions constitute “investigations” and 
“proceedings” under the complementarity principle embodied in Article 17 of the Rome Statute, see 
Robinson, supra note 114, at 498–502; Amnesty Exception, supra note 114, at 524–25. 
120 Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 17(2)(a)–(c) (the text of which supra, note 118); See also Declan 
Roche, Truth Commission Amnesties and the International Criminal Court, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 565, 
575-579  (2005) (arguing, in essence, that to satisfy the ICC complementarity principle, a truth commission 
should have five key attributes: (1) the commission’s establishment should be supported by victims; (2) 
amnesties granted by the commission should be conditional in nature (e.g., contingent upon the perpetrator 
performing some act such as a confession); (3) widespread participation in the commission by victims and 
perpetrators; (4) significant efforts to assist victims [e.g., through payment of reparations, symbolic acts 
like building monuments in victims’ honor and/ or providing an emotional “space” where victims can, 
among other things, confront perpetrators]; and (5) the commission should be part of  a wider process of 
reconstruction and reform by the nation that experienced the period of human rights abuses).    
121 See supra note 112 and accompanying text (describing the lackluster efforts by the Sudanese judiciary 
and government in both executing arrest warrants for and prosecuting suspects also indicted by the ICC). 
122 See supra, note 2 (discussing expressions of interest in truth commissions in countries where the ICC is 
either investigating or prosecuting individuals). 
123 See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, First Arrest for the International Criminal Court (Mar. 17, 
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country where the ICC is investigating could serve at least as partial evidence that a truth 
commission was created legitimately, and not for the purpose of shielding individuals 
from prosecution.  Of course, all aspects of a DRC truth commission would have to be 
evaluated before the ICC defers to it (e.g., suspend prosecution under the 
complementarity and/or interest of justice provisions).  For example, before granting a 
deferral in any particular case, the ICC Prosecutor and Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC), as the 
two primary entities charged with the decision to defer under the Rome Statute, should 
examine such aspects as whether the commission had widespread public support and 
participation, included mechanisms for victim assistance, and avoided “blanket,” non-
conditional amnesties.124 
¶45 In this regard, the Prosecutor and PTC should look to the Commission for 
Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (CAVR) in East Timor as an example of a 
commission that could satisfy the ICC complementarity and interest of justice 
requirements.  This Commission allowed for various forms of victim assistance, 
including the payment of reparations.  In addition, CAVR allowed for the possibility of 
prosecution (e.g., avoided “blanket” amnesties), particularly in the case of suspects 
committing serious crimes.  To the extent CAVR permitted amnesties, these were 
individual, conditional and available only for those who committed less serious offenses.  
Finally, CAVR permitted widespread participation by perpetrators and victims in their 
individual communities, most notably through CRP.125 
¶46 As a final method of deferment to a Sudanese truth commission, the UN Security 
Council can require that the ICC Prosecutor withhold prosecuting cases such as the ICC 
case against high-level human rights violators in the Sudan.126  To do this, the Security 
Council would have to determine that the continued prosecution of these perpetrators in 
the Sudan by the ICC represents a threat to international peace and security.127  For 
                                                                                                                                                 
2006), available at  http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=132.html; see also Press Release, Int’l 
Criminal Court, Prosecutor Receives Referral of the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Apr. 
19, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/19.html; Totten & Tyler, supra note 5, at 
1090 n.91, 1097 n.124 and accompanying text (describing failure of Sudan to cooperate with ICC in 
execution of arrest warrants for prominent ICC suspects). 
124 Under the Rome Statute, the ICC Prosecutor and PTC have a primary role in determining whether a case 
is admissible before the ICC under the complementarity and interest of justice principles.  For example, a 
referring State or the Security Council (if it originally referred the case to the ICC) may request the PTC to 
review a decision by the ICC Prosecutor not to proceed with a case under the complementarity or interest 
of justice of principles.  On the other hand, a decision by the ICC Prosecutor not to continue an 
investigation under the interest of justice provision is immediately reviewable by the PTC.  See Rome 
Statute, supra  note 95, art. 53; see also id. art. 18(2) (“At the request of that State, the Prosecutor shall 
defer [under the principle of complementarity] to the State’s investigation of those persons unless the Pre-
Trial Chamber, on the application of the Prosecutor, decides to authorize the investigation.”).  Finally, 
decisions regarding the admissibility of cases under the complementarity principle as well as under other 
jurisdictional provisions (e.g., the interest of justice principle) may be challenged in front of the PTC, an 
ICC Trial Chamber or Appeals Chamber.  See id. art. 19(6). 
125 See supra notes 69 through 79 and accompanying text, for a detailed discussion of these characteristics 
of the truth commission in East Timor. 
126 See Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 16 (“ No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or 
proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution 
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that 
request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.”). 
127 See id.; see also UN Charter ch. VII, art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide 
what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security.”). 
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example, the Council could find that a newly formed truth commission may promote 
peace in the Sudan and foster reconciliation in a way that ICC prosecutions of these 
perpetrators would not.  The Council is unlikely to make this finding in the Sudanese 
context, however, because it actually referred the Sudan case to the ICC in the first place.  
In doing so, the Council determined that certain aspects of the human rights crisis in the 
Sudan do indeed constitute a threat to international peace and security. 128  Moreover, the 
environment of impunity that currently exists in the Sudan for high-level perpetrators 
suggests that Sudanese citizens will continue to be threatened and regional peace 
compromised, until an external entity like the ICC intervenes.  Though any future 
Sudanese truth commission proceeding and investigation will not be a bar to the 
continued prosecution by the ICC of particular high-level perpetrators, such a 
commission may be able to play a pivotal role in fostering reconciliation between low-
level perpetrators and their victims, and restoring dignity to the local community (for 
further discussion of the interrelationship between the ICC and truth commissions related 
to low-level perpetrators, see Parts III and IV). 
III. INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN THE ICC AND A SUDANESE TRUTH COMMISSION 
¶47 While Part II of the Article posits that ICC prosecution of particular high-level 
Sudanese perpetrators can continue in spite of the formation of a truth commission in the 
Sudan, this Part will focus on how such a truth commission directed primarily towards 
reconciliation of victims and low-level perpetrators might interact with the ICC.  For 
example, in the case of the Sudan as well as other countries where the ICC conducts 
investigations, the ICC simply does not have the human or financial resources to 
prosecute all criminals responsible for human rights violations.  Rather, the ICC, in line 
with one of its founding purposes, focuses its efforts on those individuals most 
responsible for serious violations of international criminal law.129  As a result, for the 
large numbers of low-level perpetrators in the Sudan and elsewhere, alternative justice 
mechanisms like a truth commission must be relied upon in addition to international and 
domestic prosecutions. 
¶48 In the context of Sierra Leone, Priscilla Hayner and others have argued for a 
conditional approach to information sharing between the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and Special Court, whereby only certain information passed from the 
Commission to the Court.130  The ICC should adopt a similar approach with respect to a 
                                                 
128 See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 3; see also Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 13, 13(b) (“The Court may 
exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in Article 5 in accordance with the provisions of 
this Statute if: . . . (b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is 
referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations.”). 
129 See Rome Statute supra note 95, at pmbl, ¶ 4;  id. art. 5 (“The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited 
to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”). 
130 Exploring the Relationship, supra note 48, at 10–15.  Hayner et. al. also posit two other models for 
information sharing between truth commissions and international tribunals. See supra note 6.  One is a 
“firewall” model whereby no information is shared by the truth commission with the international tribunal, 
or court.  Hayner concludes that though this model has the benefit of encouraging testimony by perpetrators 
and others before the commission (i.e., perpetrators will not fear that the information they provide to a 
commission will be shared with a tribunal to prosecute them), this benefit is outweighed by the fact that not 
sharing certain information with a tribunal may lead to an unfair trial, and ultimately a miscarriage of 
justice (i.e., critical exculpatory information that would exonerate the accused will be withheld from the 
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truth commission that might form in one of the countries in which it is carrying on an 
investigation and conducting prosecutions, such as the Sudan.  For example, if truth 
commission information has already been exposed to public scrutiny (i.e., testimony is 
provided to a truth commission during a public hearing), then the ICC should be able to 
utilize this information in carrying out one of its prosecutions.131  In the Sudanese 
example, the ICC prosecutor could use public testimony given before a Sudanese truth 
commission to prosecute indicted individuals. 
¶49 When information is provided to a truth commission under a promise of 
confidentiality, however, the ability of the ICC to use this information should be more 
restricted under the conditional approach.  In the context of Sierra Leone, Hayner et. al. 
have argued that this type of information should only be available to prosecutors or 
defense counsel when: (1) it pertains to information which is essential to the fair 
determination of the case before it; and (2) the information cannot reasonably be obtained 
from another source.132  Similarly, when the ICC Prosecutor or defense attorney seeks 
information provided to a truth commission in confidence, the request for information 
should satisfy these two requirements, and be as specific as possible.133  Only if these 
                                                                                                                                                 
tribunal).  See id. at 8–9. Another model posited by Hayner et. al. is the “free access” model.  This model 
would allow for information to pass freely from commission to tribunal.  Hayner cautions against this 
model because of the chilling effect it would have on those otherwise willing to testify before the 
commission, and because of the perception it would create that the commission is “an investigative arm” of 
the tribunal;  See id. at 9–10.   Note that the laws applicable to the Sierra Leone Special Court and Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission were not entirely clear on whether information provided to the 
Commission in confidence could be ordered disclosed by the Special Court.  See supra, note 48. 
131 See Exploring the Relationship, supra note 48, at 10. 
132 Id. at 12.  Note that this approach to information sharing has not been actually adopted either in Sierra 
Leone or East Timor.  In the case of Sierra Leone, there is uncertainty whether information provided to the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in confidence could be ordered disclosed by the Special Court.  See 
supra note 48.  In the case of East Timor, information provided to the truth commission in confidence is 
available to the Prosecutor upon request.  See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
133 William Schabas, in the context of Sierra Leone, has also argued that requests for confidential 
information from truth commissions by the prosecutor or defense counsel of an international tribunal 
should be as specific as possible.  See Schabas, TRC, supra note 48, at 32 (“Probably, defense counsel will 
have to demonstrate with reasonable precision the nature of any evidence they believe to be in the 
possession of the [Sierra Leone Truth] Commission before judges [of the Special Court]  would even 
entertain the issue of breaching the confidentiality of the Commission.”).  Interestingly, Schabas does not 
directly advocate for a conditional approach to the sharing of confidential information between a truth 
commission and international war crimes tribunal, at least in the case of Sierra Leone.  Rather, Schabas 
contends that confidential information provided to a truth commission may be privileged, and cites Rule 71 
[now Rule 73] of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court to support his 
claim.  See id.  For the relevant portion of Rule 73, see infra note 134.  Schabas argues for the applicability 
of this privilege because all three elements of Rule 71 (2) [ now 73(2)] are satisfied:  (1) those 
communicating information to a truth commission under promise of confidentiality do so with the 
understanding that their communication will remain private; (2) confidentiality is necessary to maintain the 
relationship between the truth commission and testifying individual (i.e., the testifying individual must feel 
free to reveal all relevant information); and (3) recognition of the privilege furthers the objectives of the 
Court by ensuring that Court and Commission are able to both contribute in the most profound way to 
justice and reconciliation.  See Schabas, TRC, supra note 48, at 32-33.  For the relevant portion of Rule 73, 
see infra note 134.  But even Schabas admits that the privilege might not be applicable in all circumstances, 
especially when application of the privilege would undermine the right to a fair trial: “But even if the 
judges were prepared to recognize that TRC testimony given in confidence was privileged, they might also 
conclude that respect for the privilege entails a breach of the right to a fair trial.  And all concerned parties, 
including the Prosecutor and the TRC, have an interest in fair trials taking place. A truth and reconciliation 
commission will hardly want to contribute to a system where the rights of the accused are compromised.”  
Schabas, TRC, supra note 48, at 33–34.  Perhaps meshing the approaches of Hayner et. al. and Schabas 
strikes the necessary balance here; that is, confidential information provided to a truth commission is 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  H U M A N  R I G H T S  [ 2 0 0 9  
 
 24
requirements are satisfied would the information provided in confidence to the truth 
commission not be “privileged” under the Rome Statute, and hence subject to disclosure 
to the ICC.134 
¶50 Furthermore, in the case of the disclosure of confidential truth commission 
information to the ICC, the Prosecutor or defense counsel should seek an order from the 
Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) of the ICC requesting that the truth commission in the affected 
country (i.e., the Sudan) disclose the information in question.  In this way, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber will serve as the decision-maker on all matters related to information sharing 
between a truth commission and the ICC.  Selecting the PTC as the final decision-maker 
in these matters finds support in the ICC statutory regime itself; for example, other 
significant powers, such as the power to issue arrest warrants,135 authorize particular 
investigations,136 and order prosecutions,137 also reside in the PTC.  In addition, using the 
PTC as the focal point for information sharing decisions ensures a greater degree of 
impartiality and independence in the making of the decisions than if a Trial Chamber 
itself was assigned this role.  Unlike a Trial or Appeals chamber of the ICC, the PTC is 
not directly responsible for the actual trial of a particular case, including the 
determination of final judgment and sentence.138  As a result, PTC judges’ decisions 
whether to order disclosure of information will be more objective since they are further 
                                                                                                                                                 
generally privileged and not subject to disclosure except when: (1) it pertains to information which is 
essential to the fair determination of the case before it; and (2) the information cannot reasonably be 
obtained from another source.  Examples of this type of confidential information might be information 
tending to prove the innocence of an accused, (i.e., exculpatory information), or information which 
contradicts key information provided by a trial witness. 
134 See supra note 133.  Rule 73 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal 
Court states in pertinent part: 
(1) [C]ommunications made in the context of the professional relationship between a person and his or her legal 
counsel shall be regarded as privileged, and consequently not subject to disclosure, unless: (a) The person consents 
in writing to such disclosure; or  (b) The person voluntarily disclosed the content of the communication to a third 
party, and that third party then gives evidence of that disclosure. 
(2) . . . [C]ommunications made in the context of a class of professional or other confidential relationships shall be 
regarded as privileged, and consequently not subject to disclosure, under the same terms as in sub-rules 1 (a) and 1 
(b) if a Chamber decides in respect of that class that: (a) Communications occurring within that class of relationship 
are made in the course of a confidential relationship producing a reasonable expectation of privacy and non-
disclosure; (b) Confidentiality is essential to the nature and type of relationship between the person and the 
confidant; and (c) Recognition of the privilege would further the objectives of the Statute and the Rules. 
Int’l Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 73, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 2002) [hereinafter ICC Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence],  
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rules_of_Proc_and_Evid_070704-EN.pdf  
135 Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 58(1) (bestowing power to issue an arrest warrant in the Pre-Trial 
Chamber). 
136 Id. art. 15(4) (conditioning power of Prosecutor to initiate an investigation on authorization by the Pre-
trial Chamber); see also id. art. 57(3)(d) (establishing that Pre-Trial Chamber may authorize Prosecutor to 
investigate within a State Party without permission of the State if it is evident that the State is unable due to 
lack of authority).  See supra note 110 and infra note 137, for another specific example of when the Pre-
Trial Chamber can order an investigation by the Prosecutor. 
137 Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 53(3)(b) (establishing that the PTC has the power to require the 
Prosecutor to investigate or prosecute a case, even if he had previously concluded it was not in the interest 
of justice to do so).  See also supra note 110 and accompanying text, for an additional explanation of the 
interest of justice provision. 
138 For a description of the separate divisions, or chambers, within the ICC, see Rome Statute, supra note 
95, art. 34(b) (creating an Appeals, Trial and Pre-Trial Division within the ICC); art. 39(1)–(2) (creating 
Chambers within each separate Division of the ICC, and assigning a certain number of judges to each of 
these Chambers). 
Vol. 7:1] Christopher D. Totten 
 25
removed from the actual hearing and prosecution of a case (which is the duty of the 
judges of the Trial and Appeals chambers).  This removal, or distance, of PTC judges 
from the direct prosecution of a case is ensured by the ICC Statute itself, which prohibits 
a PTC judge from serving as a Trial Chamber judge on the same case.139 
¶51 In the process of making its decision to order release of information belonging to 
a truth commission, the PTC should hold a hearing where it considers the opinion of 
commission officers, the victims, perpetrators or witnesses who originally provided the 
information to the commission, and the other side to the case (i.e., prosecutor or defense 
counsel).140  After holding its hearing, the PTC will either order that the information be 
disclosed by the commission, or that the information is of a type that does not merit 
disclosure (i.e., it is not essential to the fair determination of a case, or it can be obtained 
from a source independent of the commission).141 
¶52 Note that if the PTC orders disclosure to the ICC Prosecutor of information 
provided in confidence to a truth commission, the Prosecutor should be barred from using 
this information to prove the guilt of the person who originally provided the confidential 
information.  This bar is consistent with the right against self-incrimination provided 
through the ICC Statute.142  The bar also provides an incentive to perpetrators and others 
to provide information to the truth commission in the first place.143  The confidential 
information ordered disclosed could, however, be used against others facing prosecution 
before the ICC.  It also could also be used to impeach the credibility of the person who 
originally provided it (i.e., if the person later makes a statement before the ICC which is 
inconsistent with the information he or she provided in confidence to the truth 
commission).144  While requests for information belonging to the truth commission 
                                                 
139 Interestingly, though judges of the Pre-Trial and Trial Divisions can serve in both Divisions, no judge 
from these Divisions can serve on the same case as a member of both Divisions.  See id. art. 39(4) 
(“Nothing in this article shall, however, preclude the temporary attachment of judges from the Trial 
Division to the Pre-Trial Division or vice versa, if the Presidency considers that the efficient management 
of the Court’s workload so requires, provided that under no circumstances shall a judge who has 
participated in the pre-trial phase of a case be eligible to sit on the Trial Chamber hearing that case.”).  This 
provision helps to ensure the effective independence and impartiality of judges in each of the divisions. 
140 See Exploring the Relationship, supra note 48, at 12.  Hayner et al. argue that in the case of Sierra 
Leone, these individuals should be given an opportunity to be heard before the Special Court if it is in the 
interest of justice to do so.  Hayner also argues that the safety of individuals who originally provided the 
information to the commission should likewise be considered by the Court, and when necessary, adequate 
protective measures should be applied when the Court determines such individuals to be at risk.  Id.  
Similarly, the ICC should provide protective measures to individuals who feel at risk as result of disclosure 
of TRC information. These measures are clearly authorized by the Rome Statute.  See, e.g., Rome Statute, 
supra note 95, art. 43(6) (creating a Victims and Witnesses Unit within the Registry of the Court 
responsible for protecting victims and witnesses); art. 68(2) (allowing for evidence to be presented in 
camera when safety of witness, victim or accused endangered); art. 68(5) (allowing Prosecutor to submit 
evidence in summary form in pre-trial proceedings when disclosure by witness herself would cause grave 
threat to her safety). 
141 The PTC, if it orders disclosure, should evaluate the information received from the truth commission 
and verify that it meets the two pronged test discussed in the text.  If, for some reason, it does not, then the 
information should still be withheld from the party requesting it.  See Exploring the Relationship, supra 
note 48, at 12. 
142 Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 67(1)(g) (“[The accused shall] [n]ot to be compelled to testify or to 
confess guilt and to remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt 
or innocence.”). 
143 Exploring the Relationship, supra note 48, at 13. 
144 See id.; See supra note 36.    
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should be as specific as possible,145 the ICC Prosecutor and defense counsel may not 
always possess knowledge of certain key information in the hands of the commission.  
Accordingly, in the interest of promoting justice and fair play, information which would 
lead to the acquittal of an individual before the ICC (e.g., “critical exculpatory 
information”) should be made available to a party by the commission even in the absence 
of a formal request.146 
IV. SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUDANESE ICC DEFENDANTS WHO HAVE TESTIFIED 
BEFORE A TRUTH COMMISSION  
¶53 A Sudanese truth commission as well as other commissions constituted in 
countries where the ICC is investigating should ideally be seeking testimony from 
witnesses, victims and low-level perpetrators in order to create a record of human rights 
abuses and reconcile post-conflict societies.  Modern-day truth commissions should 
follow this general approach, similar to the one adopted by the truth commission in East 
Timor, to avoid any unnecessary conflict with the ICC.147  Nevertheless, a situation may 
arise where a high-level perpetrator of interest to the ICC Prosecutor has provided 
testimony to a truth commission.148 If the ICC seeks to prosecute such a perpetrator, one 
might question whether that perpetrator’s participation in the truth commission process 
should in any way affect his or her prosecution or sentence (in the event of successful 
prosecution)?  While the answer to this question may vary depending on the peculiarities 
of the situation in the particular country where the ICC is investigating, the Sudanese 
                                                 
145 For example, requests for information by a party should be “sufficiently specific so as not to be a 
‘fishing expedition,’ but need not be so specific as to precisely identify which documents shall be 
disclosed.”  Id. at 14 (citing Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Decision on the Appellant’s 
Motions for the Production of Material, Suspension or Extension of the Briefing Schedule, and Additional 
Filings, ¶ 4 (Sept. 26, 2000)).  A request “may be deemed [sufficiently] specific if it asks for statements 
given by named persons, but may be deemed too broad if it asks for all statements given about named 
persons.”  Id.  See also Schabas, TRC, supra note 48, at 32. 
146 Exploring the Relationship, supra note 48, at 14 (“In general, critical exculpatory information should be 
shared.”).  Regarding incriminating information, while the commission should encourage the release of this 
information to the ICC by the party providing it to the commission, the primary avenue to obtain this 
information should be a formal request by a party to the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC.    
147 The focus of the ICC Prosecutor under the Rome Statute is on perpetrators of grave international crimes 
(e.g., “high-level” perpetrators).  See supra notes 113 and 129.  For a description of the prohibition on the 
participation of high-level perpetrators in the truth commission process in East Timor, see supra note 75 
and accompanying text.  Note that juvenile perpetrators, even if “high-level,” might still be handled 
principally by a truth commission in light of the lesser degree of culpability and greater possibility of 
rehabilitation typically associated with this class of perpetrators.  Such treatment of juvenile offenders was 
encouraged in East Timor.  See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text. 
148Note that the putative high-level perpetrator’s testimony may be provided to the truth commission either 
before or after that perpetrator’s indictment by the ICC.  This possibility is apparently permitted by the 
Sam Hinga Norman decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. In the appeals decision issued in this 
case, the judge of the international tribunal (i.e., the Special Court) permitted the giving of testimony to a 
truth commission (i.e., the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission) by an indicted person in the 
tribunal’s custody provided that: (1) the person’s testimony was provided through sworn affidavit, and not 
given in public; and (2) any additional testimony provided by this person to the truth commission was given 
in camera (i.e., in a private hearing within the commission’s chambers).  See Michael Nesbitt, Lessons from 
the Sam Hinga Norman Decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone: How trials and Truth Commissions 
can Co-exist, 8 GERMAN L.J. 977, 1002 (2007) (citing Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT, 
Decision on Appeal by the TRC and Norman, paras. 39, 41 (Nov. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=rYK5weliv5I=&tabid=193). 
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example is illustrative of the range of options available to the Prosecutor.  In particular, 
two options will be explored in this section:  amnesty and reduced charges.  
A. Amnesty 
¶54 If a Sudanese truth commission decided to grant a “blanket,” unconditional 
amnesty to high level perpetrators, this should not bar the ICC from prosecuting this class 
of perpetrators.  Drawing upon the arguments in Part II of this article, a truth commission 
amnesty in the Sudanese context would not serve the “interests of justice” if applied to a 
high-level perpetrator.  As a result, the ICC Prosecutor could still proceed with the 
prosecution of such a perpetrator under the Rome Statute.149  Factors for deciding whether 
the application of a truth commission amnesty to a particular perpetrator is in the 
“interests of justice,” include the gravity of the crime and the role of the perpetrator in the 
crime.150  Because high-level perpetrators are those who commit grave crimes, and have a 
significant role in these crimes, the “interests of justice” would be best served by 
allowing the ICC Prosecutor to prosecute these individuals.  Moreover, in the particular 
context of Sudan, justice would not be served through truth commission granted amnesty 
to high-level perpetrators because these very perpetrators maintain high-level positions in 
government and the military, and therefore would, in all likelihood, be the ones creating 
the opportunity for amnesty.151  Not prosecuting these high-level perpetrators would only 
                                                 
149 See Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 53.   
150 Id. art. 53(2)(c). 
151 For a discussion of the governmental and military roles of high-level human rights violators in the 
Sudan, and the overall environment of impunity in which they operate, see supra notes 4, 107, and 111–
112.  See also Thomas Hethe Clark, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Amnesties, and 
the Interests of Justice: Striking a Delicate Balance, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 389, 409-410 
(2005) [hereinafter Delicate Balance].  
It is important to determine whether the amnesty will serve the security and social-rehabilitation requirements of 
the transitional society. A crucial indicator of whether the amnesty was granted with the proper purposes in mind 
is the identities of the parties responsible for the amnesty. 
. . . [P]rograms of self-amnesty by a former regime will generally not qualify [as being in the interest of justice, 
and hence meriting deferral by the ICC Prosecutor]. This is particularly so in cases where the military was a main 
perpetrator. Amnesties should, under no circumstances, be given to the military in order simply to relieve the 
potentially great pressure that the armed forces can bring to bear. Despite the danger to the transitional 
government, the harmful effects of impunity are compounded in situations where groups formerly in power are 
able to negotiate impunity for crimes they have committed.  
Id.   
 Significantly, Clark and other commentators have recognized instances when amnesties might be in the interest of 
justice, thereby warranting ICC prosecutorial deferral.  For instance, the ICC Prosecutor might choose to defer to an 
amnesty when “amnesty was granted under an internationally negotiated agreement, in which parties from the former 
regime, representatives from the newly-installed government and international officials and observers participated . . . .  
The presence of representation of the transitional regime at these negotiations—especially if democratically elected—is 
particularly credible evidence that the amnesty should be respected.”  Id. at 410.  Factors Clark posits should be 
examined to determine when an amnesty is in the interest of justice include: (1) whether the amnesty is part of a 
“scheme” to break with a country’s troubled past, and transition into a newly constituted government; (2) whether the 
amnesty is accepted by the populace; and (3) whether those granted amnesty fall into “strictly defined categories.”  Id. 
at 409.  See also Amnesty Exception, supra note 114, at 512 (“Although providing amnesty may sometimes be 
necessary to achieve peace, there are important considerations favoring prosecution that suggest amnesty should be a 
bargaining tool of last resort reserved only for extreme situations.”).  Given the Sudan government’s unwillingness to 
cooperate with international actors, most notably the ICC itself, the likelihood that amnesty in the Sudan would be 
anything more than “a gift” from the government to itself is highly unlikely. In other words, amnesty in the Sudan 
would not likely be the result of a consensus of the populace and “outside” observers but rather part of a “program of 
self-amnesty.”  See Delicate Balance, supra, at 410. 
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further foster the environment of impunity already existing in Sudan.  For example, the 
Sudanese judiciary has yet to carry out a prosecution of a high-level perpetrator, and 
recently released from jail one such perpetrator (e.g., Ali Kushayb).152  In addition, for at 
least some of the crimes committed by this category of  perpetrators, such as genocide 
and torture, the ICC is prohibited from complying with any amnesty deal under 
international law.153  Finally, not prosecuting the leaders of the international crimes in 
Sudan might lead victims to carry out private acts of revenge against them, and 
encourage future human rights violations by leaders.154 
¶55 In very specific contexts like that of South Africa and East Timor where the state 
and its populace are in the midst of a transition to a more stable, democratic existence, 
amnesties may be permitted if they are reserved for a specific category of perpetrators 
(i.e., directed at perpetrators who committed abuses during a certain time period), and if 
the amnesties are withheld until the eligible perpetrator fulfills certain pre-determined 
terms and conditions (i.e., the perpetrator pays reparations to the victim, performs 
community service, discloses relevant facts, etc.).  For example, in upholding the 
individual, partial and conditional amnesty provided by the South African Truth 
Commission, the Constitutional Court of South Africa noted:     
The amnesty contemplated is not a blanket amnesty against criminal 
prosecution for all . . . .  It is specifically authorized for the purposes of 
effecting a constructive transition towards a democratic order [e.g., by 
giving perpetrators an incentive to disclose particular human rights abuses 
and victims and survivors an opportunity to learn the nature of those 
abuses].  It is available only when there is a full disclosure of all the facts 
to the Amnesty Committee and where it is clear that the particular 
transgression was perpetrated during the prescribed period and with a 
political objective committed in the course of the conflicts of the past.  
That objective has to be evaluated having regard to . . . careful criteria . . . 
.155 
¶56 As it did in South Africa, amnesty may also have a role where criminal evidence 
forming the basis for prosecutions is scarce, or even non-existent,156 or the state is simply 
too fragile, or unstable, to undergo systematic prosecutions.157  But these reasons seem 
less relevant in the Sudan where there is no visible societal or governmental transition to 
                                                 
152 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
153 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
154 See id. at 512–514. 
155 Azanian Peoples Org. v. President of S. Afr. 1996 (4) SA 672 (CC) at para. 32 (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1996/16.pdf. 
156 See id. at para. 17; see also Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. 
REV. 1, 3–6 (1998) [hereinafter Reflections]. 
157 See Azanian Peoples Org. 1996 (4) SA 637, at paras. 18–19; see also Reflections, supra note 156, at 4.  
In addition, Cassese argues in his article that “the notion of domestic prosecutions is sometimes dismissed 
in favour of amnesty and truth commissions when the society in question is too fragile to survive the 
destabilizing effects of politically charged trials. . . .  [T]his consideration would only operate as a bar to 
domestic tribunals — an international tribunal, by contrast, could conduct the work at a distance — both 
physical and political — from the destabilizing national forces.  This is a reason for preferring international 
tribunals to national courts, in certain circumstances . . . .”  Id.     
Vol. 7:1] Christopher D. Totten 
 29
democracy, and the ICC Prosecutor and others have uncovered ample evidence of on-
going, grave crimes.  Moreover, though there is certainly some instability in Sudan, most 
international criminal trials of high-level human rights abusers should cause little, if any, 
additional destabilization of Sudanese government or society.  These trials are 
sufficiently removed from Sudan, and are generally not accessible to the general 
populace, or even all state actors.  In addition, the very concept of amnesty under 
international human rights law for the types of grave human rights abuses committed in 
the Sudan has been called into question in landmark cases decided by prominent 
supervisory bodies in the field of international human rights, such as the UN Human 
Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights.158  Finally, in 
light of the fractured state of Sudanese society, it may be difficult to reach local 
agreement, or consensus, on the appropriateness of an amnesty for high-level 
perpetrators.  To ensure reconciliation in conflict-ridden societies like the Sudan, such a 
consensus (as reflected by a national vote, or referendum) should be required before 
governments institute amnesty programs for this category of perpetrators.159 
¶57 Note, however, that international human rights law and related policy 
considerations would not appear to prohibit partial, conditional amnesties for particular 
individuals committing minor criminal or non-criminal offenses in the Sudan.  For 
example, the UN-supported truth commission in East Timor possessed the ability to grant 
amnesty to specific perpetrators who committed minor offenses so long as the perpetrator 
fulfilled the terms of the relevant reconciliation agreement.  In the Sudanese context, like 
in East Timor, the overall reconciliation process as well as future transition to more 
stable, democratic government might be best facilitated by allowing for a limited form of 
amnesty for low-level perpetrators (e.g., a partial, conditional amnesty).  Moreover, such 
an amnesty takes into account the scarce, limited resources in the Sudan or elsewhere that 
would be available to investigate, try and convict the large number of low-level Sudanese 
perpetrators from the human rights crisis in Darfur.  In particular, providing an incentive 
in the form of a limited amnesty for individual, low-level perpetrators may encourage 
these individuals to come forward and participate in the truth commission process, 
thereby enabling victims and survivors to learn new details of particular abuses and 
perpetrators an opportunity to reconcile themselves with their former communities. 
¶58 In addition, interest of justice considerations reflected in the ICC statutory regime 
that disfavor amnesty for high-level perpetrators in the Sudan appear to be markedly 
different in the case of low-level perpetrators.  The latter class of perpetrators, by their 
very nature and status, commit less serious crimes, are less likely to have a role in the 
very creation of the opportunity for amnesty, and can be more easily reconciled and 
                                                 
158 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Uruguay, UN ICCPR Human Rights Comm., 51st Sess.,  ¶ 12.4, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988/Annex (Aug. 9, 1994) (“The [Human Rights] Committee moreover reaffirms its 
position that amnesties for gross violations of human rights . . .  are incompatible with the obligations of the 
State Party under the [International] Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights].”); Chanfeau-Orayce v. Chile, 
Case 11.505 et al., Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 25/98, OEA/ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 109 (1998) 
(“[Inter-Am. Comm. on Human Rights agrees:] [t]o recommend that the State of Chile adjust its domestic 
legislation by derogating the [amnesty law for crimes committed by Chilean government officials during 
the military regime of General Augusto Pinochet], in order to comply with the provisions of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, in order that the human rights violations of the military de facto government 
may be investigated and the perpetrators may be identified, their responsibility established and that they 
may be effectively punished, thus guaranteeing for the victims and their families the right to justice.”).  
159 See Delicate Balance, supra note 151, at 409. 
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reintegrated back into their communities (without the heightened concern for private, 
multiple acts of revenge present in the case of high-level perpetrators).  As a result, the 
ICC statutory regime, including both its interest of justice provisions and its overall 
mission to prosecute grave crimes of international concern, does not appear to be violated 
by a limited amnesty directed toward low-level perpetrators.  Finally, even if the ICC 
Prosecutor was, for some reason, determined to prosecute one of these low-level 
perpetrators eligible to participate in a Sudanese truth commission amnesty process, he 
may be prohibited from doing so under the principle of complementarity maintained 
under the ICC framework.  This is because the considerations and factors that make it 
unlikely that high-level perpetrators can be adjudicated in an independent and impartial 
manner in the Sudan do not appear to be as strongly present in the case of low-level 
perpetrators.  For example, through successful domestic prosecutions, the Sudanese have 
demonstrated an ability to deal impartially and effectively with low-level abusers.  In 
addition, future Sudanese truth commission officers, like the local judges and jurors 
involved in the domestic-level prosecutions, will most likely not fear retaliation or 
reprisal as strongly in cases involving investigation and adjudication of low-level 
perpetrators.  Such concern or fear, however, would likely be heightened in the case of 
adjudication of high-level perpetrators who would tend to have close, extant relationships 
with current or recently deposed military or governmental leaders.  In other words, like 
the East Timorese, the Sudanese may be capable, especially with the help of the 
international community, of fair and impartial truth and reconciliation proceedings, 
including ones involving the possibility of amnesty, once the leaders of the grave human 
rights abuses are effectively dealt with by the international forum (e.g., the ICC). 
¶59 Drawing upon the truth commission experience in East Timor, a Sudanese truth 
commission amnesty framework should specifically delineate its terms and conditions.  
For example, Sudanese low level perpetrators committing minor criminal and non-
criminal offenses related to the period of the human rights crisis in Darfur should be 
allowed to obtain amnesty for these offenses only if they reconcile themselves 
successfully with their respective communities.  Eligibility for participation in this 
limited amnesty process should be determined by the appropriate truth commission body 
in consultation with the ICC Prosecutor or his or her designee.  Only if the ICC 
Prosecutor agrees to participation by the perpetrator in the amnesty process should the 
process be allowed to proceed.  Successful reconciliation by the perpetrator might take 
the form of a full disclosure of the facts underlying the abuse, acknowledgment by the 
perpetrator of his/her role in inflicting the abuse, the payment of reparations or a similar 
act performed by the perpetrator (i.e., community service) directly to the victim and/ or 
the victim’s community, and a renunciation of future violence.  The appropriate Sudanese 
truth commission body could decide the precise reconciliation terms, and monitor 
compliance with the reconciliation agreement.  
¶60 In addition, individuals attempting to obtain amnesty in this way before the 
Sudanese commission (as well as all individuals testifying before the commission) should 
be informed of their opportunity to provide information in confidence to the commission.  
Such an opportunity will provide an incentive for individuals to come forward and 
participate in the truth commission process, including the amnesty and reconciliation 
process.  In particular, the promise of confidentiality will help to mitigate any concern or 
fear on the part of perpetrators that they will not be ultimately determined eligible for the 
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amnesty process, or that the information they provide will be shared with judicial 
prosecutors, including the ICC Prosecutor.  If information is provided in confidence to 
the commission, including information constituting an admission of responsibility, this 
information should not be disclosed to the ICC Prosecutor except if specifically requested 
by the Prosecutor.  Even if the ICC Prosecutor requests the information in this way, it 
should not be disclosed to the Prosecutor unless the PTC determines it is essential to the 
fair determination of a case before the ICC, and cannot be obtained from an independent 
source.  Note that even in the event of authorization by the PTC and eventual disclosure, 
the confidential information should not be used by the Prosecutor to prosecute the 
individual who provided it to the commission but it could be used, for example, as 
evidence to prosecute another person.  (See Part II for further discussion of the role of the 
PTC regarding information sharing decisions).  In this way, by providing for a limited 
amnesty mechanism and by pre-arranging the terms under which information can be 
shared with the ICC, a future Sudanese truth commission will avoid at least some of the 
pitfalls that befell the Sierra Leonean truth commission in its relationship with the Special 
Court, and more closely resemble the overall commission-court structure imposed in East 
Timor. 
B. Reduced Charges 
¶61 Rather than respecting any amnesty granted by a Sudanese truth commission to 
leaders of human rights abuses, the ICC should instead consider reducing the sentence of 
a leader who has participated meaningfully in the truth commission process, and is later 
successfully prosecuted.  Following such an approach would seem to better strike the 
balance between respecting a likely illegitimate Sudanese amnesty for these leaders and 
essentially ignoring the leader’s participation in the truth commission process.  In 
addition, this approach finds support in the ICC Statute, which allows the Court to 
consider certain mitigating factors when determining an appropriate criminal sentence.160  
These mitigating factors focus, in part, on the conduct of convicted persons, including 
any compensation these persons provided to victims and any cooperation they exhibited 
towards the Court.161  Of course, before awarding any reduction in sentence, the Court 
should ensure itself that the Sudanese leader’s participation in the commission process 
was indeed meaningful and “cooperative,” and not just accomplished hastily, half-
heartedly and for the sole purpose of obtaining leniency.  Measures, or factors, that the 
                                                 
160 Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 76(1) (“In the event of a conviction, the Trial Chamber shall consider 
the appropriate sentence to be imposed and shall take into account the evidence presented and submissions 
made during the trial that are relevant to the sentence.”).  For particular “mitigating” evidence the Trial 
Chamber of the ICC can take into account in sentencing an individual convict before the ICC, see infra 
note 161. 
161 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 134, R. 145(2)(a)(i)–(ii).  Mitigating circumstances 
the Court may consider in determining a particular sentence include: “(i) The circumstances falling short of 
constituting grounds for exclusion of criminal responsibility, such as substantially diminished mental 
capacity or duress; (ii) The convicted person’s conduct after the act, including any efforts by the person to 
compensate the victims and any cooperation with the Court.”  Id.  For the provision dealing with the overall 
sentencing determination, see id. R. 145(1)(a)–(b).  For a list of “other” factors the Court may consider in 
sentencing a convicted person, see id. R. 145(1)(c).  For a list of specific aggravating circumstances the 
Court may consider, see id. R. 145(2)(b).  See also Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 78(1) (“In determining 
the sentence, the Court shall, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, take into account 
such factors as the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.”). 
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Court should consider in making this determination include:  (1) whether the Sudanese 
leader who perpetrated grave human rights abuses provided financial or other 
compensation to victims as part of the commission process;162 (2) whether the perpetrator 
accepted responsibility for his/her role in the abuses; (3) whether the perpetrator provided 
testimony to the truth commission that contributed significantly to the historical record of 
the abuses; (4) whether the perpetrator provided testimony to the commission that 
contributed significantly to knowledge of whereabouts of victims’ remains; and (5) 
whether the perpetrator complied with victim requests to confront the perpetrator about 
particular abuses he or she may have participated in.163  If consideration of these factors 
leads the Court to conclude that the convicted person cooperated in a meaningful way 
with the truth commission,164 then the Court could mitigate the sentence accordingly.  Of 
course, before reaching its final sentencing determination, the Court must also take into 
account any aggravating factors on the part of the convicted person.  Only after weighing 
all of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including the perpetrator’s 
participation in a truth commission process, would the court reach its final sentencing 
decision.165  In the case of a convicted Sudanese defendant, any mitigation by the ICC as 
a result of participation in a truth commission process would take the form of a reduced 
prison sentence or a reduced fine.166 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶62 Similar to the international tribunals in East Timor and Sierra Leone, the ICC will 
eventually interact with a truth commission, whether in the Sudan, DRC or in another 
country.  As a result, a deeper understanding of how the ICC must interact with these 
bodies is paramount.  Attention should first be directed to whether the ICC must defer to 
a national truth commission process, or whether it can proceed with the criminal 
prosecution of perpetrators.  In making this determination, the ICC should consider 
whether the commission had widespread public support and participation, included 
mechanisms for victim assistance, and avoided “blanket,” non-conditional amnesties.  In 
addition, the ICC could examine the nature and level of cooperation provided by national 
officials in the investigation, adjudication and enforcement of human rights abuses. 
                                                 
162 This factor finds support in the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence. See id. R. 145(2)(a)(ii). 
163 Many of these factors were mentioned in the Truth and Reconciliation Report, or Rettig Report, by the 
Chilean truth commission in the form of recommendations by the commission for dealing with the period 
of human rights abuses during the Pinochet regime.  See Chilean Nat’l Comm. on Truth and Reconciliation, 
Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, Part II, (Phillip Berryman trans., 
2 vols., 1993), available at http://www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/reports/chile/chile_1993_toc.html. 
164 The Court’s determination of whether to mitigate a sentence because of meaningful cooperation by the 
convicted person with a truth commission process, would take place in a special hearing held by the Trial 
Chamber on its own calling, or at the request of either the convict or the Prosecutor.  See Rome Statute, 
supra note 95, art. 76(2) (“[T]he Trial Chamber may on its own motion and shall, at the request of the 
Prosecutor or the accused, hold a further hearing to hear any additional evidence or submissions relevant to 
the sentence, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”).  All interested parties (e.g., the 
Prosecutor, accused, and victims) may participate in such a hearing. Id. at arts. 76(3), 75(3).    
165 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 134, R. 145(1), (1)(b) (“In its determination of the 
sentence . . . , the Court shall: . . . (b) Balance all the relevant factors, including any mitig1ating and 
aggravating factors and consider the circumstances both of the convicted person and of the crime.”).  For a 
list of aggravating circumstances or factors that the Court must take into account, see id. R. 145(2)(b). 
166 See Rome Statute, supra note 95, art. 77.  
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¶63 Moreover, a set of principles for how information, especially confidential 
information, should be passed from a truth commission to the ICC must be formulated.  
The balance between sharing “too little” of the commission’s information (and risking 
unfair trials before the ICC) and sharing “too much” (and risking non-participation by 
perpetrators in the truth commission process itself) is perhaps best struck through a 
conditional approach to information sharing.  Under this approach, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
of the ICC could  serve as the principal decision-maker on all matters related to the 
disclosure of truth commission information. 
¶64 Finally, in the event a high-level perpetrator testifies before a truth commission 
and then is subsequently convicted by the ICC, the Court should examine carefully the 
perpetrator’s participation in the overall commission process prior to determining its final 
sentence.   While any amnesties granted by truth commissions to high-level perpetrators 
should be viewed with a large degree of skepticism, certain aspects, or qualities, of the 
high-level perpetrator’s participation may lead the ICC to consider a statutory reduction 
in sentence.  In the case of low-level perpetrators participating in a truth commission 
amnesty process in a country where an ICC investigation is on-going, the ICC may 
legitimately defer to such a process provided the process itself meets certain criteria.   For 
example, in the Sudan, these criteria may include restrictions on the types of offenses 
eligible for truth commission amnesty (i.e., minor versus grave offenses), the time period 
for which the amnesty applies (i.e., crimes committed during the duration of the crisis in 
Darfur), and precise reconciliation terms that must be fulfilled before amnesty is actually 
granted (i.e., terms related to payment of reparations, performance of community service 
acts, disclosure of facts, etc.). 
